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Does the First Amendment follow the flag? In Boumediene v. Bush, the
Supreme Court categorically rejected the claim that constitutional rights do not
apply at all to governmental actions taken against aliens located abroad.
Instead, the Court made the application of such rights, the First Amendment
presumably included, contingent on "objective factors and practical concerns."
In addition, by affirming previous decisions, Boumediene also extended its
functional test to cover even U.S. citizens, leaving them in a situation where they
might be without any constitutional recourse for violations of their First
Amendment rights. But lower courts have found in the recent case of USAID v.
Alliance for Open Society ("USAID") an implication that free speech rights exist
abroad, at least by U.S. registered entities or U.S. citizens.
This Article resolves this doctrinal ambiguity, arguing courts should
recognize that the First Amendment covers speech made beyond U.S. borders.
It situates existing First Amendment precedents within the broader framework
set by decisions pertaining to the Constitution's extraterritorial application and
extends First Amendment coverage to both citizen and alien speech in cases
where either speech has been subject to government regulation outside
traditional national borders. Both conceptions of the First Amendment-either
as a right that accrues to the individual or as a structural limitation against
the government-support such an interpretation. But what are the implications
of recognizing an extraterritorial First Amendment? In the last part of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law; S.J.D., Harvard Law
School (2013). Special thanks to Noah Feldman for the guidance and encouragement in writing
this paper, Tim Zick for our extended correspondence, and Adam Shinar for the countless
conversations on the topic. Many thanks to David Armitage, Or Bassok, Guyora Binder, Joseph
Blocher, Jim Gardner, Rick Garnett, Paul Horwitz, Lisa Kelly, Duncan Kennedy, Jed Kroncke,
Shay Lavie, Heidi Matthews, Zina Miller, Palma Paccioco, Ryan Scoville, Steven D. Smith, Chris
Szabla, Kaja Tretjak, Mark Tushnet, the participants at the Harvard Law and SUNY Buffalo Law
faculty workshops, and to the IACL Roundtable for Constitutional Responses to Terrorism for their
helpful comments on various drafts. I am also grateful to Daniel Hay, Charles Jones, Courtney
Mitchell, Jean Xiao, and other student editors at the Vanderbilt Law Review for their careful
editing and insights. All remaining errors are mine.
1373
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Article, I compare and contrast the decisions in USAID and Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project to show the judicial weight given to the foreign
policy considerations of the government.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Texas A&M University, a public university with a
satellite campus located in Doha, Qatar, imposes a speech code banning
religiously injurious speech within the confines of its overseas campus.
Could its faculty members or students, both U.S. citizens and
noncitizens alike, assert their First Amendment rights against the
university? Or suppose that a foreign nongovernmental organization
1374 [Vol. 67:5:1373
2014] SPEECH BEYOND BORDERS 1375
("NGO") challenges federal grant restrictions that prevent NGOs from
promoting certain reproductive health services abroad. Could that
entity be allowed to avail themselves of the same First Amendment
protections accorded to its American counterpart?2 These examples
illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether the First
Amendment applies beyond U.S. borders.
The extent to which geography and constitutional rules overlap
is a question that has vexed courts and scholars alike since the wake of
the Spanish-American war at the end of the nineteenth century.3 But
while other provisions of the Bill of Rights-such as the right to a jury
trial,4 the right to criminal due process,5 the right against cruel and
unusual punishment,6 the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,7 and most recently, the right to habeas corpus under Article I,
Section 98-have received some judicial and academic treatment for
their extraterritorial applications, the right to freedom of expression
has yet to garner such attention.9
1. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
2. Compare DKT Mem'1 Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that policy limitations on foreign aid funds do not unconstitutionally infringe on the First
Amendment rights of domestic nongovernmental organizations), with USAID, 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013) (holding that policy limitations on foreign aid funds infringe on the First Amendment rights
of nongovernmental organizations).
3. The literature is voluminous, but any canonical list would include the following: GERALD
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter STRANGERS]; KAL RAUSTIALA,
DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? (2009); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient
Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225
(2010); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11 (1985); Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms,
International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT'L. L. 307 (2011); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009)
[hereinafter Extraterritorial Constitution]; Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and
Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073 (2005).
4. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
5. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Turney v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
6. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
7. United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S.
Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d (D.C. Cir. 2009).
9. There is a recent spate of writings on the subject, but none have directly addressed the
various aspects of an extraterritorial First Amendment. At most, Zick argues for a reorientation
of how courts see the First Amendment but does not address its doctrinal foundations. See
TIMOTHY ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING TRANSBORDER EXPRESSIVE
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES (2013) [hereinafter THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT]; Timothy
Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging Complexities in Transborder Expression,
65 VAND. L. REV. 123 (2012) [hereinafter Shouting Fire in a Global Theater]; Timothy Zick, The
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The uncertainty surrounding the abovementioned scenarios
suggests that this gap needs to be addressed. Moreover, recent
headlines, such as the global dragnet surveillance activities of the
National Security Agency ("NSA"), implicate similar issues. Its still-
unfolding repercussions make it likely that the extraterritorial reach of
the First Amendment will be an important, recurring question in the
immediate future. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, 10 domestic
human rights groups brought a facial challenge to a provision of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") authorizing government
electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons located outside the United
States. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, stated that these
domestic groups lacked standing because they failed to identify any
nonspeculative harm."
Three months after Clapper, Edward J. Snowden, an exiled U.S.
citizen and former independent contractor for the NSA, revealed the
breathtaking scope of the NSA's programs, both domestic and
international.12 Under the Court's reasoning in Clapper, both citizens
and noncitizens alike could now theoretically allege that their First
Amendment rights, among others, have been violated-unlike with the
plaintiffs in Clapper, the fear of surveillance is no longer speculative.13
It is not obvious, however, that noncitizens could make such a claim or
even have standing to do so. In a related scenario, would a noncitizen
such as Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, who is still under threat of
prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917,14 be able to invoke the
protection of the First Amendment?
Finally, as a practical matter, this inquiry is long overdue. As
the initial examples illustrate, advanced modern travel and
First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 941 (2011) [hereinafter The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective]; Timothy Zick,
Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at-and Beyond Our Borders, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1543, 1598 (2010). For a subject-specific treatment, see Michael J. Lebowitz,
"Terrorist Speech": Detained Propagandists and the Extraterritorial Application of the First
Amendment, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 573 (2010).
10. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
11. Id. at 1143.
12. Media coverage of the leaks is ubiquitous. See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance,
NSA Files: Decoded-What the Revelations Mean for You, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-
revelations-decoded, archived at http://perma.cc/7CM4-VEAK; Joshua Eaton, Timeline of Edward
Snowden's Revelations, AL-JAZEERA AMERICA (June 5, 2013), http: america. alj azeera.com/articles/
multimedia/timeline-edward-snowden-revelations.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8PX9-LRU9.
13. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
14. See Dianne Feinstein, Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7,




communications technologies, increasingly porous national borders,
and heightened government scrutiny and regulation of speech are now
reopening classic questions on the reach of constitutional protections.
Examining the myriad issues urrounding this question would lay out
an initial framework for future inquiries.
Part of the problem lies in murky doctrine. The jurisprudential
landscape involving the extraterritoriality question is, at best,
ambiguous. While the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v.
Bush categorically rejected the claim that constitutional rights do not
apply at all to governmental actions taken against aliens located
abroad, it also made the application of such rights-the First
Amendment presumably included 15-contingent on "objective factors
and practical concerns."16 In Boumediene, the Court answered the
question whether an affirmative constitutional right to habeas
extended to noncitizens detained in Guantanamo Bay.17 Upholding
previous decisions, the Court extended the functional test to cover even
U.S. citizens, leaving them in a situation where they might be without
any constitutional recourse. The import and application of the decision
outside the habeas context, therefore, remains unclear. With regard to
the First Amendment in particular, such ambiguity is marked with
tension. In the recent case of USAID v. Alliance for Open Society
International, Inc. ("USAID"), 18 several domestic NGOs filed a
constitutional challenge against government regulations requiring
them to sign a pledge espousing an antiprostitution message as a
condition of receiving federal funds for humanitarian services abroad,
particularly the promotion of reproductive health. The Court affirmed
the free speech claims of the NGOs, holding that the pledge
requirement fell outside the scope of the government program and
hence was impermissible compelled speech.19 Although the fact that the
speech was going to be uttered abroad was not mentioned in the
decision, this factor was raised in several instances in the lower courts
and even during the oral arguments before the Supreme Court.20 Hence
USAID implies that free speech rights, at least those of U.S.-registered
entities or U.S. citizens, already exist abroad.
This Article resolves this doctrinal confusion and argues that the
First Amendment covers speech made beyond U.S. borders and so
15. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008);
16. Id.
17. Id. at 770-71.
18. 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25 (2013).
19. Id. at 2330.




should be judicially recognized. It situates existing First Amendment
precedents within the broader framework set by decisions pertaining to
the Constitution's extraterritorial application. In particular, it extends
First Amendment coverage to both citizen and alien speech subjected to
government regulation outside traditional national borders. The
distinct constitutional treatment of aliens and citizens has already been
the subject of voluminous literature with respect to other rights;21
however, it remains unexplored what difference, if any, an
extraterritorial free speech right makes to the prevailing
understandings. The two conceptions of the First Amendment-either
as a right that accrues to the individual or as a structural limitation
against the government-both support the interpretation of making its
protections available to citizens and aliens alike. Recognizing the
extraterritorial First Amendment, however, is only the beginning.
What are the implications of such recognition? In many instances, an
extraterritorial speech right is more than likely to go against legitimate
foreign policy interests as crafted by the political branches of
government, as well as international law, since First Amendment
jurisprudence is less restrictive than global standards on freedom of
expression. The last part of this paper looks at an area where this claim
would have the greatest impact: government speech abroad.
Two related caveats about he scope of my discussion are
appropriate here. First, my focus is on the negative First Amendment-
that is, the free speech and press clauses as a constraint on government
action beyond U.S. borders. In the following account, the First
Amendment is a shield, not a sword. I do not include in my discussion,
for example, the exportation of First Amendment norms by citizens
claiming its benefit in opposing foreign libel judgments that were
obtained under laws that do not approximate First Amendment
protections,22 or by aliens challenging restrictions on foreign
contributions in U.S. elections. This should hopefully mitigate
understandable concerns about cultural imperialism. The aim of
recognizing an extraterritorial First Amendment is precisely to expand
the reach of constitutional protections in order to rein in the exercise of
U.S. government power, not to facilitate its imposition, and make those
constitutional remedies available to both aliens and citizens. And while
21. The classic work is STRANGERS, supra note 3; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1990); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989); Chimine I.
Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 55 (2010) (using a comparative analysis of
three constitutional systems).
22. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2006); Desaiv. Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
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conflicts with local laws should rightfully be a factor for U.S. courts
facing these kinds of claims, those conflicts are factors that go into the
application of the right, not its recognition.
Second, my discussion covers primarily the threshold issue of
whether the First Amendment exists extraterritorially at all. There are
many extant issues surrounding an extraterritorial speech right, but
the heart of the confusion revolves around whether such a right exists
in the first place and what its contours might look like given prevailing
doctrines that are in tension with one another. This is the main
question that needs clarification.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the case law on
the applicability of constitutional rights abroad leading to the decision
in Boumediene, as well as the scattered cases in which courts have
reluctantly, if not obliquely, addressed the applicability of the First
Amendment in an extraterritorial context. It then analyzes the First
Amendment within the new jurisprudential milieu established by
Boumediene. Part III offers theoretical justifications for an
extraterritorial First Amendment by looking to the text of the
Constitution, the history of its drafting, and the justifications
underlying freedom of expression to determine what, if any, insights
these sources can offer on this question. Although text and history are
not dispositive on their own, taken together, they provide support for
the case of an extraterritorial First Amendment. The Article also
evaluates existing and proposed rationales for freedom of speech,
arguing that they are capacious enough to accommodate and justify the
protection of speech that occurs outside U.S. borders. Part IV analyzes
the scope of an extraterritorial First Amendment. It argues that citizens
should be able to invoke the First Amendment outside the United
States, while aliens could also claim its benefit regardless of their
location provided that they have been subject to an exercise of U.S.
government power and it would not be "impracticable and anomalous"
to do so. Lastly, Part V considers the implications of an extraterritorial
First Amendment, especially acknowledging the foreign policy interests
of the government. This Part compares and contrasts the Court's
decisions in USAID and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in light of
the differing weights accorded to the government interest. The
Conclusion reflects on possible trajectories of the First Amendment
abroad.
II. PRECEDENTS
First Amendment jurisprudence and the long history of
Supreme Court decisions on the application of the Constitution abroad
2014] 1379
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have gone along on parallel but distinct tracks. Moreover, the First
Amendment has not yet been the subject of an extraterritorial analysis
by the Court. Recent developments-doctrinal, social, political, and
technological-are pushing the Court's extraterritoriality and speech
towards a collision course, however. This Part will examine the
pertinent cases under each track and how they might fit with one
another.
A. Extending Constitutional Rights Abroad
This Section briefly outlines the development of the Court's
extraterritoriality jurisprudence, beginning from the Insular Cases in
the early twentieth century to Boumediene in 2008. The following cases
do not involve the First Amendment, but taken together, they establish
the general framework against which the extraterritoriality of the
various provisions in the Bill of Rights are evaluated.
1. The Insular Cases
In a series of cases decided over the early decades of the
twentieth century now known as the Insular Cases,23 the Supreme
Court sanctioned a constitutionally distinctive regime for newly
acquired U.S. colonies. Up until that time, the prevailing rule was that
the Bill of Rights, and the rest of the Constitution for that matter,
stopped at the water's edge.24 This rule bore the vestiges of its time,
steeped as it was in the strictly territorial Westphalian notion of
23. For a general introduction, see BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006). On why studying the Insular Cases remains
important, see Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases
and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000). The number of the
cases included varies among scholars, but there is a consensus on these fifteen: Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dowdellv. United States,
221 U.S. 325 (1911); Rassmussenv. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Dorrv. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183
U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S. Co.,
182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S.
243 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
24. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464:
By the constitution a government is ordained and established "for the United
States of America," and not for countries outside of their limits. The guaranties it
affords against accusation of capital or infamous crimes, except by indictment or
presentment by a grand jury, and for an impartial trial by a jury when thus
accused, apply only to citizens and others within the United States, or who are
brought there for trial for alleged offenses committed elsewhere, and not to
residents or temporary sojourners abroad.
1380 [Vol. 67:5:1373
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sovereignty. There were glaring exceptions to be sure,25 but by and
large, the reach of laws was deemed congruent with national territory.
However, as Professor Kal Raustiala noted, the domain of
constitutional liberties has steadily expanded since then.26 When the
Court decided De Lima v. Bidwell,27 the first of the Insular Cases, the
court not only ruled on whether the tariff laws of the United States
extended to Puerto Rico as it would to a foreign country, but it also
irreversibly expanded the geographic reach of U.S. law. That the
colonies were "foreign in a domestic sense,"28 as anomalous as that
designation sounded, indicated a reluctance to accept the full legal
consequences of the acquisition of territories inhabited by an exotic
populace the country was loath to count as its own. What is more, it
ushered in a cacophony that was to recur and plague the extraterritorial
reach of the Constitution for years to come, concomitant with the rise of
American geopolitical power.
The Insular Cases are generally divided into two lines of cases:
the first dealt with tariffs and customs laws while the second involved
the right to jury trials in criminal cases. The cases are famous for
making the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
territories,29 holding that only fundamental rights apply within the
latter.30 Jury trials, part of the right to criminal due process under the
Sixth Amendment, have been subjected to varying interpretations of
whether it was a fundamental right that travels to unincorporated
territories.31
Although Downes v. Bidwell,32 the most well-known of the
Insular Cases, dealt with the question of whether the Uniformity
Clause applied to Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory, the
splintered decision provided an enduring judicial framework for the
extension of constitutional rights outside the United States. The
25. The best example would be the Western extraterritorial courts in the non-Western world
during the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: The
Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China, 71 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (2008).
26. See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005).
27. 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
28. Id. at 220.
29. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901).
30. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922). But see Burnett, supra note 3, for a
persuasive alternative reading of the cases.
31. Compare Dorr, 195 U.S. at 153 (holding the extraterritorial right to trial by jury is not a
constitutional necessity in a criminal case but merely a method of procedure), with Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (holding the federal right to trial by jury applied against the
states because the right was fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment).
32. 182 U.S. 244.
2014] 1381
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Downes Court advanced three views. Justice Brown, who wrote the
majority opinion, held that the Constitution did not automatically apply
to these newly acquired territories, but that "Congress, in legislating
for the territories, would be subject to those fundamental
limitations . . . [which] would exist rather by inference and the general
spirit of the Constitution . .. than by any express and direct application
of its provisions."33 These fundamental limitations, or natural rights
referred to those personal rights that are in the Constitution and its
amendments, including the "rights to one's own religious opinions and
to a public expression of them . . . [and] to freedom of speech and of the
press."34 Justice White, while concurring in the judgment, argued
nevertheless that the Constitution was applicable everywhere and at
all times.35 But his concurrence also introduced the now-famous
distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories,
whereby only fundamental rights apply to the latter. This distinction
was categorically rejected in Justice Harlan's dissent, which stressed
that the Constitution applied to all places and peoples subject to the
authority of the United States.36
2. Reid v. Covert
Reid v. Covert37 involved the case of a woman, a U.S. citizen,
charged with murdering her husband who was an Army sergeant at a
U.S. military base in Japan. The Court took this occasion to squarely
repudiate the archaic view behind In re Ross and held that
constitutional rights protect individual citizens from the actions of the
government whether abroad or at home.38 In holding that civilian
citizens are entitled to a nonmilitary jury trial pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment, the plurality opinion in Reid, written by Justice Hugo
Black, distinguished the Insular Cases by pointing to the different
33. Id. at 268.
34. Id. at 282.
35. Id. at 289 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence was joined by Justices
Shiras and McKenna and adopted later in Balzac, 258 U.S. 298.
36. Downes, 182 U.S. at 379-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting):
In my opinion, Congress has no existence and can exercise no authority outside of the
Constitution. Still less is it true that Congress can deal with new territories just as
other nations have done or may do with their new territories. This nation is under the
control of a written constitution, the supreme law of the land and the only source of the
powers which our government, or any branch or officer of it, may exert at any time or
at any place.
37. 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
(holding a civilian citizen entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections even for a noncapital
murder charge, essentially extending the full Bill of Rights to citizens).
38. Reid, 354 U.S. at 7. The Court declined to overrule Ross for other reasons.
1382 [Vol. 67:5:1373
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sources of regulating authority. Congress exercises plenary authority
over the colonies, irrespective of the citizenship of its inhabitants.39 But
in Reid, citizenship was the controlling factor.40 Alongside its statement
that the government is "entirely a creature of the Constitution," the
Court held that it could not selectively choose which constitutional
provisions to apply to the Federal Government.4 1 This strongly implied
that all rights contained in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and that
the restrictions always follow wherever government action is exercised,
a claim perfectly consistent with Black's own advocacy of total
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
The concurrences of Justice Frankfurter and Harlan distanced
themselves somewhat from Black's opinion. First, they held that the
Insular Cases remain valid, which they understood the plurality to be
discarding as an antiquated relic. 4 2 In addition, Justice Frankfurter
also posed the main question as a matter of analogous due process-
what was due to the accused, a civilian dependent of a military
serviceman overseas who was facing a capital murder charge?43 He
asserted that the other parts of the Constitution must be taken into
account in order to decide whether the accused should be subjected to a
court-martial.4 4 Second, Justice Harlan in particular qualified Justice
Black's statement that the Constitution applies to U.S. citizens
everywhere the federal government exercises power. The proposition,
Harlan stated, was not that the "Constitution 'does not apply' overseas,
but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not
necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place."4 5 In other
words, not all provisions are applicable overseas in cases where it would
be difficult to enforce them for a variety of reasons. For example, in
Balzac, Chief Justice William Howard Taft held the jury system to be
inapplicable in Puerto Rico because such a system needed citizens
trained in the exercise of responsibilities as jurors.4 6 Puerto Ricans, who
39. Id. at 14.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 5-6, 8-9:
While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which are
"fundamental" protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise,
for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of "Thou shalt nots" which
were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by
the Constitution and its Amendments.
42. Id. at 67.
43. Id. at 44, 75.
44. Id. at 44.
45. Id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("But, for me, the question is which guarantees of
the Constitution should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities,
and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it.").
46. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922).
2014] 1383
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had a civil law background, did not have the experience to serve as
common law jurors.4 7 This functionalist test, which made the
applicability of constitutional provisions contingent on factual
conditions and circumstances, would reappear in slightly varying forms
in Justice Kennedy's opinions in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez4 8
and Boumediene.4 9
3. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez
As we will see in detail later,50 Verdugo-Urquidez is more
relevant to the distinction between guarantees accorded to aliens and
those exclusively available to citizens, but Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in that case is worth mentioning at the outset. The case
dealt with whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the search and
seizure by U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agents of the person
and property of a nonresident alien residing in Mexico.5 1 Affirming the
Reid ruling that "Government may only act as the Constitution
authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic,"52
Justice Kennedy concluded in any case that the application of the
Warrant Clause would have been "impracticable and anomalous"
because of the difficulty of locating available judges or magistrates to
issue the necessary warrants and the perhaps unascertainable, if not
downright different, conceptions of reasonableness and privacy in
Mexico. 53 This "impracticable and anomalous" standard took center
stage in Boumediene, the most recent decision that dealt with the
extraterritorial application of a constitutional right (the Suspension
Clause). In that case, Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion.
Verdugo- Urquidez also stands for the proposition that
constitutional rights do not extend to those who are not considered
members of "the people."54 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, construed the text of the Fourth Amendment and its use of
the term "people," unlike the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as referring
47. Id.
48. See 494 U.S. 259, 291 (1990).
49. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758-59 (2008).
50. See infra Part IV.A.
51. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 291.
52. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 277-78. For a different holding on the application of the Fourth Amendment
abroad, see also United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013) andIn re Terrorist Bombings
of U.S. Embassies in E. Mr., 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), which held that the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment does not have extraterritorial application, only the reasonableness
requirement.
54. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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only "to a class of persons who are part of the national community or
otherwise have developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community."5 5 He also invoked the authority of
the Insular Cases, which held that not all constitutional provisions
necessarily apply in all places where the U.S. exercises sovereign
power. One of the justifications for this interpretation was a slippery
slope concern that applying the Constitution to aliens extraterritorially
would produce deleterious and disruptive consequences for U.S.
military and law enforcement operations abroad as they would be
besieged by aliens' claims for damages.5 6 Hence, the Court concluded,
any remedy should properly be within the province of the political
branches, not the courts.
4. Boumediene v. Bush
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez found its
way into his majority opinion in Boumediene, which elevated the
"impracticable and anomalous" standard as the prevailing rule on
extending rights abroad. There is ongoing scholarly debate on what this
standard actually means and how it might apply in practice.5 7 This is
especially significant as the analysis in Boumediene largely turned on
whether the standard would allow for the application of the Suspension
Clause to the alien detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay prison.58
Significantly, Boumediene did not directly address the citizenship of the
petitioner-detainees, which the dissent and the critics of the decision
pointed out. Even its discussion of Johnson v. Eisentrager, was focused
on the practical circumstances of providing access to habeas to German
citizens detained at Landsberg Prison in Allied-occupied postwar
Germany.59
Instead, Justice Kennedy identified the degree of control the
U.S. government exercised over the base, the costs of holding habeas
55. Id.
56. Id. at 273-74.
57. For a comprehensive take on the question, including an overview of the debates, see Jesse
Merriam, A Clarification of the Constitution's Application Abroad: Making the "Impracticable and
Anomalous" Standard More Practicable and Less Anomalous, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 171
(2012).
58. This was the main complaint of Eric Posner, who argues that, pursuant to Eisentrager,
citizenship should have controlled the analysis. See Eric Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain
March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008 CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 23, available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/pl228.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M9YN-FJRA
(criticizing the decision as an instance of judicial cosmopolitanism, an emerging view that interests
of nonresident aliens deserve constitutional protection secured by judicial oversight).
59. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S 723, 762 (2008).
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proceedings, and the potential for diplomatic friction with the Cuban
government as the main practical factors in determining whether to
ultimately give full effect to the Suspension Clause.0 Legal scholars
such as Gerald Neuman argue that Boumediene represents an entirely
new functionalist approach in determining the extent of the
Constitution's reach beyond national borders, characterizing it as a
"global due process" approach.61 Indeed, the majority opinion's
recitation of precedents from the Insular Cases to Eisentrager62 and
then Reid all the way to Verdugo- Urquidez clearly pointed to the
unifying thread animating the opinion and, by extension, the current
state of the extraterritoriality doctrine: whether constitutional rules
would actually travel and apply, even accepting the proposition that
they remain a priori operative everywhere the U.S. government acts,63
depends on practical considerations.
B. The First Amendment Beyond Borders
Although the Court has never directly considered the question
of whether the First Amendment has extraterritorial application, the
Court has vaguely considered the possibility in a few cases. Short of
providing doctrinal rules, the following cases nonetheless form fertile
ground for a future reconsideration of freedom of speech as an
extraterritorial claim.
1. Haig v. Agee
In 1974, Philip Agee, a disillusioned former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency, who was residing in West Germany,
divulged the identities of undercover CIA agents, employees, and
sources located around the world as part of his "campaign to fight the
CIA wherever it is operating."64 The Secretary of State later revoked his
passport on the ground that his activities were causing serious damage
to U.S. foreign policy and national security.65 The resulting legal tussle
60. Id. at 760-62. In addition to practical factors, the others are status of the detainees and
nature of their location.
61. Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2008).
62. See infra notes 198, 202-04 and accompanying text.
63. Cf. Burnett, supra note 3 (arguing for a two-tiered inquiry: whether a constitutional
guarantee applies and, only after that question, how an applicable guarantee might be enforced).
64. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283 (1981). See generally PHILIP AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY:
CIA DIARY (1975) (containing "Who's Where" sections listing the names of alleged CIA employees
on a country-by-country basis and "Who's Who" sections containing detailed biographical
information on all such persons).
65. Haig, 453 U.S. at 311.
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went all the way to the Supreme Court, ending with Haig v. Agee, 66
where the Court held that the passport revocation was constitutional.
Agee argued that the Secretary of State's revocation of his passport
undermined both is Fifth Amendment liberty interest to travel as well
as his First Amendment right to criticize government policies. 67 In his
view, the revocation was an unconstitutional penalty for speaking out
against the government.68 The majority embarked on a two-tiered
analysis. First, it distinguished Agee's case from previous decisions
since it was not only his beliefs and speech that were being curtailed
but also his conduct or action. The majority recognized that the
government has a legitimate interest in safeguarding national security.
In this case, Agee's conduct, which included traveling to different
countries and working with his collaborators there in order to expose
agents operating in the country, endangered such security and the
government's diplomatic relations with other nations.69 Hence,
restricting his foreign travel was the "only avenue open to the
Government to limit these activities."70 But second, and more
significant for present purposes, the Court also gave a hedged view of
whether the First Amendment applies beyond borders, stating that
"[a]ssuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections reach beyond
our national boundaries, Agee's First Amendment claim has no
foundation."71 Again, the reason offered by the Agee Court is that the
revocation was due mainly to his conduct, not his speech. The majority
did acknowledge that Agee would have been free to criticize the U.S.
government as he was when he held a passport.72
2. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for International Development
In DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for International
Development,73 an early precursor of the USAID case, the D.C. Circuit
addressed a First Amendment challenge lodged by domestic and foreign
NGOs against the government's refusal, under the Foreign Assistance
Act, to fund groups that engage in activities promoting or implementing
66. Id. at 309.
67. Id. at 287.
68. Id. at 306.
69. Id. at 308.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 309. But see id. at 318 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (taking as
a given that Agee's speech abroad was constitutionally protected and arguing that there should
have been an express delegation made by Congress to the Secretary of State to revoke passports
for national security reasons).
73. 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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abortion abroad. Pursuant to the Mexico City Policy, all private
organizations receiving federal funding are prohibited from performing
or promoting abortion services in other countries even with non-U.S.-
government funds. 74 This policy has been in effect intermittently since
1984. All Republican administrations have adopted the rule, but the
rule has been rescinded every time a Democratic president is elected.75
The appellate court dismissed the claims of the foreign NGOs on
standing grounds, holding that nonresident aliens acting
extraterritorially did not fall within the "zone of interests" protected by
the First Amendment.76 In doing so, it implicitly recognized that
domestic NGOs have an extraterritorial speech right abroad.77 That
speech right, however, did not encompass an unfettered freedom to
associate with the foreign NGOs. The domestic entity in question, DKT
International, asserted that the restrictions on foreign NGOs were an
unconstitutional burden on its own right to associate with these foreign
entities. The court's rejection of this argument rested on two related
reasons. First, it upheld the prerogative of the government to engage in
viewpoint discrimination in subsidizing activities consistent with its
foreign policy choices.7 8 Therefore, the government communicates a
chosen message abroad not only through its expressed means but also
through "its choice of foreign entities with whom it will associate."79
Second, pursuant to Kleindienst v. Mandel80 and Palestine Information
74. Other constitutional challenges to the Mexico City Policy similarly failed. See, e.g., Ctr.
for Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the Mexico
City Policy did not violate the NGO's equal protection rights); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the policy did not violate
Planned Parenthood's freedom of speech). For domestic organizations, the prohibition only covers
government funds, not their own. See DKT, 887 F.2d at 277.
75. The rule was rescinded on January 23, 2009, two days after Barack Obama took office as
President. It had been reinstated during the administration of George W. Bush on January 22,
2001, also two days after he took office. See Mexico City Policy and Assistance for Voluntary
Population Planning, 74 Fed. Reg. 4903 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2009-01-28/pdf/E9-1923.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BMG2-BDBE.
76. DKT, 887 F.2d at 283-85.
77. Id. at 291 ("A recognition of a right, whether or not constitutionally based, for American
entities to pursue certain goals with their own funds while receiving largess from the government
for other pursuits does not in any way mandate that the same treatment must be afforded foreign
entities.").
78. Id. at 289.
79. Id. at 291. This was also the gist of Justice Scalia's dissent in USAID, although he did
not explicitly frame it using the government speech category. See USAID, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332-
33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The program is valid only if the Government is entitled to disfavor the
opposing view (here, advocacy of or toleration of prostitution). And if the program can disfavor it,
so can the selection of those who are to administer the program.").
80. 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding the exclusion of Mandel, a nonresident alien and
academic, from the United States to speak before U.S. citizens).
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Office v. Shultz,81 the right of expressive association is not without
limits. DKT, in other words, would be free to associate with its foreign
partners but without the use of federal funds.82 Further, the court
rejected the notion that an organization could expressively associate
with another association, noting that Supreme Court precedents only
protected such a right for individuals.83
The dissent of then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg directly spoke
to the extraterritorial speech rights of U.S. citizens and entities.
Starting with the premise that DKT's claims rests on "the freedom to
communicate, to receive communications, and to maintain associations,
at home and abroad, that United States residents enjoy vis-A-vis the
United States government,"84 she then proceeded to criticize the
decision as essentially a roundabout way of curtailing the constitutional
freedoms of DKT by penalizing its foreign partners.85 Her analysis
focused on the speech rights of DKT abroad involving its private funds,
which would necessarily entail, absent any compelling cause, freedom
to access "audience, adherents, and associates among foreign NGOs."8 6
3. U.S. v. Al Bahlul
The ongoing Global War on Terror provides another salient
dimension to the question of extraterritorial speech. In United States v.
Al Bahlul,87 Ali al Bahlul, a Yemeni national, was convicted under the
Military Commissions Act for providing material support and resources
to al Qaeda, among others.88 Al Bahlul argued that his conviction was
inappropriately based on political speech otherwise protected by the
First Amendment, specifically his production and dissemination of the
video entitled "The Destruction of the American Destroyer U.S.S. Cole."
The prosecutors averred that the video was used as a propaganda and
recruitment tool by al Qaeda in Afghanistan.89 There was no discussion
81. 853 F. 2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (using the O'Brien test to uphold the State Department's
closure of the Palestine Information Office).
82. See DKT, 887 F.2d at 293 (distinguishing between interference with the exercise of a
right and the refusal to subsidize a right).
83. Id. at 294.
84. Id. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 308 ("[T]he government recognizes that cutting off domestic NGOs from all AID
funds if they deal with foreign NGOs that offer abortion-related services would amount to
punishing domestic NGOs 'for exercising their constitutional rights of free speech and free
association in conjunction with foreign NGO[s].' ").
86. Id. at 307.
87. 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011).
88. Id. at 1156.
89. Id. at 1161.
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of whether, as a noncitizen, al Bahiul could even invoke the First
Amendment. The court, oddly enough, proceeded to consider the facts
of the case under both a theory where the First Amendment did and did
not apply. In the former case, it nevertheless concluded after a strict
scrutiny analysis that the video fell outside the protections of the First
Amendment as it was "aimed at inciting viewers to join al Qaeda, kill
Americans, and cause destruction."90 Invoking the Brandenburg test,
which forbids advocacy directed to inciting imminent lawless action,91
the court held that the subjects of the proscribed advocacy or threat
need not even be specific individuals, but it suffices that there were
identified targets.92 In this case, al Bahlul's video, which was intended
to incite people to kill Americans, was regulable under Brandenburg.93
It also deemed the prohibition of terrorism, even if it affected and
curtailed speech, a compelling congressional interest.94
4. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project/USAID v. Alliance for
Open Society
More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project the limits on the right to expressive
association. In Holder, the Court upheld statutory provisions that
prohibited the provision of material support or resources to certain
foreign organizations designated as engaging in terrorist activity.95 The
petitioner, Humanitarian Law Project ("HLP"), claimed that it only
sought to provide legal training and political advocacy to two groups:
the Kurdistan Workers' Party ("PKK") and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam ("LTTE")-both designated terrorist organizations by the
State Department.96 The Court rejected the expressive association
claim of HLP because the penalty is not on the mere fact of association
but on the accompanying provision of material support.97 Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented and held
90. Id. at 1249.
91. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969):
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
92. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7 (2010). The provision in question is
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012), which makes it a federal crime to "knowingly provide[] material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization."
96. Holder, at 10.
97. Id. at 18.
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that it is this very sort of speech and association that the First
Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection.98 The recognition
of the extraterritorial locale of the speech right here is implicit. The
coordinated speech and training between HLP and the foreign groups
could have easily been in New York, Europe, or Asia, all places where
international organizations such as U.N. agencies are located. Or it
could also have been conducted within the United States. The Court's
reasoning seemingly assumed this when it acknowledged HLP's First
Amendment claim, only to deem it outweighed by the government's
interest in combating international terrorism.
In USAID, a seemingly contemporary incarnation of the 1989
DKT case, the funding restriction that covered both government and
private funds, which previously had only applied to foreign NGOs, now
applied to domestic NGOs. But this restriction on private funds and
speech came in a novel form: organizations must sign a pledge ex ante
in which they manifest a position opposing prostitution as part of their
award document from USAID. 99 Such speech opposing prostitution
must be uttered not only at the moment of signing the pledge but also,
as the complaints of the NGOs illustrated, at all times when the NGO
is abroad and working with U.S. government funds. Put another way,
the restriction suppressed what they could have constitutionally
uttered as private speech when using private funds on their other
projects. During oral arguments for the case, the Government pointed
out that it was the foreign location of these activities that made the
pledge necessary for ensuring that government objectives were met. 100
The organizations were going to be perceived as messengers and
speakers of U.S. policy priorities.101 The NGOs, all U.S.-registered
entities, challenged the restriction as unconstitutionally compelled
speech, which the Court eventually upheld. 102 Although the text of the
decision did not mention the foreign setting of the speech interests of
both the U.S. government and the domestic NGOs, the Court recognized
their First Amendment interests are as present abroad as they are here
at home in its ensuing compelled speech analysis.
98. Id. at 42-43.
99. USAID, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (2013).
100. Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 20, at 27.
101. Id. at 55-56.
102. USAID, 133 S. Ct. at 2332.
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C. Resolving the Tension in Favor of an Extraterritorial
First Amendment
The foregoing cases illustrate a judicial landscape marked by
ambiguity and tension insofar as an extraterritorial First Amendment
is concerned. On the one hand, Boumediene and its army of precedents
tells us that the Bill of Rights in its entirety only applies under certain
circumstances abroad, subject to functionalist considerations and
whether U.S. citizens are involved. In addition, the case did not justify
its extension of habeas to the petitioner-detainees in Boumediene, who
were all non-U.S. citizens, leaving open the normative inquiry on the
kinds of claims aliens can or cannot make under the U.S. constitutional
scheme. On the other hand, the Court's reluctance to even recognize
that the First Amendment might cover, though not necessarily
protect,103 speech made abroad is in tension with the ready
acknowledgement hat the First Amendment, at least for U.S. citizens,
already does cover such speech, as the Court held in USAID and as
then-Judge Ginsburg's argued in her dissent in DKT. In addition, the
court's First Amendment analysis with respect to al Bahlul's political
speech appears to give the impression that aliens could avail
themselves of First Amendment protections outside the United States,
even though his speech ultimately failed the Brandenburg standard.
One factor that contributes to this confusion, and perhaps also
the key to its resolution, is the dual character of the First Amendment-
and the rest of the Bill of Rights for that matter-as both an individual
right and a structural limitation. Both the text ("Congress shall make
no law. . . .") and history arguably supports such an interpretation. 104
As a structural limitation, it uncontroversially travels wherever the
government acts. But as an individual right, it is enmeshed in the
aforementioned doctrinal quagmire. Indeed, even the underlying
justifications for freedom of expression have personal (individual
flourishing) and structural (self-governance) aspects. But if it was only
a structural limitation, then the beneficiaries need not be limited to
103. The distinction between coverage and protection in First Amendment jurisprudence is
well known. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765 (2004). This Article's proposal of
an extraterritorial First Amendment refers to coverage, and not necessarily protection, as there
might be legitimate competing government interests that would trump its application.
104. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991);
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MiAMi L. REV. 275 (2008);
Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and U.S. Foreign Aid,
95 GEO. L.J. 171 (2006). There are specific difficulties associated with viewing the Establishment
Clause as only structural, however, which is not the case with the Speech and Press Clauses,
because the Court has never interpreted the Establishment Clause in such a manner.
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citizens. It is hard to see any member of the Court accepting the full
import of that view. Consider the following scenario: An official
California trade mission in Shanghai discriminates in hiring only
Chinese workers of Han ethnic descent. Could any non-Han Chinese,
residing in China, claim an Equal Protection Clause violation against
the State of California? The intuitive answer would be an uneasy no,
although a structural view of the Bill of Rights supports otherwise. As
Justice Kennedy stressed in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Constitution does
not create any juridical relation between the United States and a
"limitless class of noncitizens" located outside national borders.105 It
also falls squarely under the concern of opening the litigation floodgates
to a deluge of potentially disruptive constitutional claims.
How to delineate a limit to the class of noncitizens able to invoke
the Constitution extraterritorially is a question appropriate to the
discussion of the coverage of the extraterritorial First Amendment. For
now, the example is salient for another reason. Why should we allow
both the citizens and noncitizens in a satellite campus of a public
university located in the Middle East to invoke the First Amendment
against such a speech code but not the noncitizens in China to make an
Equal Protection claim against the State of California for
discriminatory hiring?
The answer is in the nature of the right being invoked. Professor
Jules Lobel has recently argued that this structural-individual rights
distinction is ultimately illusory and indefensible for many reasons.106
Using Boumediene, Lobel shows how the Court had correctly treated
the right to habeas as protecting separation of powers concerns, thus
upholding rule of law values, inasmuch as it confers a constitutional
right in favor of the petitioner-detainees. 107 Boumediene, however, did
not explain the disconnect between the two conceptions of habeas. Lobel
thus proposes resolving this disconnect by resorting to a fundamental-
norms analysis-that is, whether a constitutional principle would apply
outside the United States depends on its character as a fundamental
norm crucial to a democratic order. 108
Such analysis supports the extraterritoriality of the First
Amendment. In fact, this concern suffuses the extraterritoriality cases.
The common denominator underlying the three divergent views in
Downes was the focus on fundamental rights. No doubt freedom of
105. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 276 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad, 98
IOWA L. REV. 1629 (2013) (arguing that the distinction is illusory for purposes of determining
whether a provision should apply abroad).
107. Id. at 1650-51.
108. Id. at 1634.
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speech is of such character. Even for Justice White, who argued that
the application of the Constitution is contingent on whether the
territory was incorporated or not, fundamental rights nevertheless
apply even to unincorporated areas.109 And the majority, through
Justice Brown, explicitly cited freedom of religion and of speech as
among these natural rights and fundamental limitations on
government action.110 The same concern over fundamental rights
undergirded Reid, where the main question revolved around whether
the right to jury trial is of such a character.111 Moreover, although
Verdugo- Urquidez did not apply the Fourth Amendment abroad, the
case has been interpreted by lower courts insofar as citizens are
concerned to apply only to the Warrant Clause, a procedural
requirement, rather than its reasonableness requirement for the
search, which is a substantive concern.112 Lastly, while Boumediene
collapses the fundamentality of the Suspension Clause as a mechanism
to monitor and maintain the separation of powers essential to the U.S.
political tradition,113 with its character as an individual right, the
clause nonetheless provides solid ground for an extraterritorial First
Amendment to anchor itself. It is erroneous to state, therefore, as the
Agee court surmised,114 that the First Amendment does not even go
beyond national boundaries. At best, Boumediene limits that conclusion
in cases where the practical considerations would make it difficult to
uphold the constitutional claim in full. 1 15 At the same time, it affirms
the underlying assumption in Holder and USAID that citizens, at the
least, could invoke the First Amendment abroad.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS
But why recognize an extraterritorial First Amendment?
Constitutional text, history, and the prevailing philosophical
justifications that continue to inform contemporary free speech
jurisprudence support this conception. In this Part, I also include the
international legal commitments of the United States to support my
109. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S 244, 291 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 252.
111. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
112. In re Terrorist Bombings ofU.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
113. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 833 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981).
115. In the Texas A&M example at the beginning of this Article, one practical consideration
is that Islam is the established religion in Qatar, and if the full protection of the First Amendment
is invoked to protect what could be deemed blasphemous speech, it might conflict with the
dominant religious and political culture of the country.
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argument. Taken individually, these factors are hardly dispositive. But
evaluated as a whole, they provide considerable support that such a
right exists outside U.S. borders.
A. Text and History: A Location-Neutral First Amendment
The subject of what the First Amendment protects is clear: it
protects the freedom of speech.116 What is less clear is whether the
reach of that protection extends beyond the traditional borders of the
United States. The constitutional text also does not identify any
limitations on the identities of the speakers on whom that protection is
bestowed. The First Amendment simply defines the entity it restrains:
Congress. 117 Thus, it is difficult to dispute the assertion that the text
itself suggests that the First Amendment is not limited in its
application within a particular territory. Most probably, the Framers
simply never considered it in any geographic milieu in light of the
origins of the Bill of Rights as primarily a practical device to win over
skeptics into ratifying the Constitution-a "parchment barrier" as
James Madison famously put it. 118
Given that the text of the First Amendment is location neutral,
the question then turns to its intended beneficiary. Unlike other
amendments, its text does not mention citizen,119 state,1 20 or people.1 2 1
In fact, this ambiguity had led courts, including the Supreme Court, to
apply it to corporate personalities as well as governmental entities.122
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech. . . .").
117. The First Amendment has been interpreted to apply to the federal government as a whole
and, since 1925, against states as well. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against
the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution). See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:
THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 1787-88 (2011) (describing the role of the Bill of Rights
in the ratification debate). The Constitution, however, is another matter where foreign affairs
occupied center stage. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law ofNations, and the Pursuit ofInternational Recognition, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 932 (2010) (arguing that the core purpose of the Federal Constitution was for the United
States to be recognized as a member of the European civilized community).
119. See U.S. CONST. amends. XI, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
121. Id. Note however that the Assembly and Petition Clause of the First Amendment does
refer to people, but the Speech, Religion and Press Clauses do not. Even so, the First Amendment
has never been interpreted under a strictly compact or membership approach.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. I (relating to right to peaceably assemble); id. amends. IV, IX.
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For instance, in Citizens United v. FEC,123 the Court held the identity
of the speaker as immaterial for purposes of determining what kind of
speech merits protection. On the locus of speech, nothing definitive
exists from the historical record during the period of the framing.124
However, I offer two historical episodes that can give us further
guidance on both the scope of First Amendment protection-i.e.,
whether it covers only citizens or whether it extends to aliens at home
and abroad. The first scenario involves the debates surrounding the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, during which the meaning of the First
Amendment was fully elaborated; the second episode involves examples
from the period of U.S. territorial expansion, primarily in the colonies
acquired from Spain pursuant to the Treaty of Paris of 1898. During
this period, the First Amendment was applied to and availed of by
people in territories which had not yet been or would never be admitted
into statehood.
It might surprise many that there was not much said of freedom
of speech during the framing period. Madison, the drafter of the Bill of
Rights, simply held the view that the national government could not
put any restriction on speech. Unlike its counterpart clause on religion,
which had been explicated in many writings at the state level prior to
the ratification of the Constitution,125 the meaning of the Speech and
Press Clauses were not made clear until the constitutional crisis of
1798. Enacted in 1798 against the backdrop of an undeclared war
against France that had produced rampant nativism, the Alien Acts,
two separate statutes, subjected aliens, whether or not they were
citizens or nationals of enemies of the United States in a declared war,
to expulsion upon mere order of the President, without any procedural
guarantees. 126 The Sedition Act, on the other hand, criminalized any
123. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Foreign corporations cannot make political contributions, but U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign corporations can.
124. Freedom of speech was elevated as a constitutional right for the first time in the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, reprinted in LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 183 (1963) ("That the people have
a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom
of the press ought not to be restrained." (citation omitted)). But there is no record of Madison's
views at that time except for his drafts. Legislative debates during the period of the framing of the
First Amendment in 1791 also did not exist.
125. The drafting of the Religion Clauses was shaped substantively by state-level debates and
writings, most especially James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, a pamphlet addressed to the Virginia General Assembly in 1785. For a brief drafting
history, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
346 (2002).
126. The Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch.
28, 2 Stat. 153; Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired June 25, 1800). For a complete
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utterance, whether spoken or written, critical of the government with a
punishment of imprisonment and fines.127 It must be noted that these
acts were symptomatic of a bitter political struggle on many fronts that
had erupted between the Federalists, led by the likes of Alexander
Hamilton and John Adams, and the Democratic-Republicans, with
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. One has to look at the picture
in this wider frame in order to truly appreciate the import of these
acts. 128
For purposes of our present inquiry, however, the importance of
this crisis lies in the insights it produced regarding the meaning of
freedom of speech and, more broadly, to whom the Constitution bestows
the protections it contains. The Republicans had condemned the
Sedition Act as a violation of the First Amendment, a charge that the
Federalists denied.129 They pointed out that the First Amendment
incorporated the understanding as explained in William Blackstone's
Commentaries, the most illustrious legal treatise in England at the
time. 130 Under that view, free speech was nothing more than the liberty
to write and speak, with an accompanying accountability to a potential
injured party. The Blackstonian understanding of free speech, however,
certainly did not intend to do away with the crime of seditious libel, and
a free press meant only freedom from prior restraints. It did not take
long for the battle to spill over to the states. Kentucky and Virginia
issued Resolutions, secretly authored by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison respectively, denounced both the Alien and Sedition Acts as
unconstitutional. 131 In what many consider a precursor to secessionist
sentiments that would reach their peak in the Civil War,132 the
Resolutions essentially argued that the states had the right and duty to
declare unconstitutional any acts of Congress not authorized by the
Constitution.
history of the Acts, see JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956).
127. The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired Mar. 3, 1801).
128. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005) (providing an account of the political
background against which The Sedition Act of 1798, as well as other legislation that has since been
judged to have abridged civil liberties, was enacted).
129. Id. at 36-41.
130. SMITH, supra note 126, at 421.
131. STONE, supra note 128, at 45.
132. The resolutions were indeed cited as precedents for the Nullification Crisis of 1832 and
the secession of the Southern states at the start of the Civil War. See generally FORREST
MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUMINIMPERIO, 1776-1876 (2002) (surveying
varying attitudes toward states' rights in the first century of the United States).
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None of the other states went along with the Resolutions. In fact,
they criticized them as a recipe for disunion.133 As a response, the
Virginia General Assembly adopted the celebrated Report of 1800,
written by James Madison, which affirmed the principles of the
Resolutions though declaring them to be without legal effect. 134 Given
Madison's stature, the Report carried an uncommon authority. In
characteristically brilliant fashion, Madison laid down one by one the
principles that would underlie the modern First Amendment and
republicanism, most notably the libertarian and absolutist view of
freedom of speech. The Sedition Act flipped the American notion that
"[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty."135
Thus, the freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment was absolute
insofar as the federal government was concerned. Significantly, he also
expounded an early view of a structural approach to constitutional
limits when it came to the treatment of aliens. Rejecting a strict social
contract approach, Madison wrote that even though aliens were not
parties to the Constitution in the same way that citizens were, it did
not mean that they could not avail of its protection so long as they owe
it their temporary obedience.136 Nonetheless, both Acts were never
invalidated by the Supreme Court, and several Republicans were
eventually arrested under the Sedition Act. 137
If the early years of the young republic tested the original
meanings of the lofty ideals set forth in the federal constitution, its
coming-of-age stretched its ideals' geographic reach. The First
Amendment was no exception to this. As the United States
substantially expanded its territory during the long nineteenth century,
the question of whether constitutional limitations attached to
territories, and by what means it did, became the focus of legal
attention. Could the Constitution be considered to have applied ex
proprio vigore-that is, by its own force, in the territories throughout
the nineteenth century-or did it only extend by congressional grace? It
was never clear whether the acquisition of territories was made
pursuant to the Territory Clause1 38 or through some rather nebulous
133. For the responses of the other states, see Frank Maloy Anderson, Contemporary Opinion
of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 5 Am. HIST. REV. 45 (1899).
134. JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800: TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS (1850).
135. Id. at 220.
136. Id. at 205.
137. STONE, supra note 128, at 63, 73.
138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States....").
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concept of general sovereignty.139 At any rate, Congress exercised
plenary powers over all territories. 140 Pursuant o this, Congress passed
organic acts that established territorial governments and appointed its
personnel. 141 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights, as we all know, did not
apply to the states until after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted
in 1868. States were governed by their respective constitutions. And
yet, despite this arrangement, the Supreme Court held the First
Amendment, specifically the Religion Clauses, to apply to the Territory
of Utah in the landmark decision of Reynolds v. United States.14 2 While
the case is more well-known for holding that the Mormon practice of
polygamy was not constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, it was also the earliest instance of extending the First
Amendment to a territory. 143
In other words, if it is possible to claim that the Bill of Rights
was applied extraterritorially in the territories, an analogous claim
could also be made that a similar state of affairs existed vis-A-vis the
colonies acquired from Spain as a result of the 1898 Treaty of Paris. 144
Similar to the organic acts of the incorporated territories, Congress, in
139. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886):
But this power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their
inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution in regard to
disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and other
property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the
territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national
government ....
140. Natl Bank v. Cnty. ofYankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879):
All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States not included in any State must
necessarily be governed by or under the authority of Congress. The Territories are but
political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States.. .. The organic law
of a Territory takes the place of a constitution as the fundamental law of the local
government. It is obligatory on and binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is
supreme, and for the purposes of this department of its governmental authority has all
the powers of the people of the United States ....
141. The first such enactment was the Northwest Ordinance. See An Act to Provide for the
Government of the Territory North-west of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789). An
explanation is in Yankton, 101 U.S. at 129 ("All territory within the jurisdiction of the United
States not included in any State must necessarily be governed by or under the authority of
Congress.").
142. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
143. Id. at 162 ("The first amendment to the Constitution expressly forbids such legislation.
Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United States, so far as congressional
interference is concerned."). For a fuller account of how Congress exercised its plenary powers over
the Territory of Utah, see SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001).
144. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 797 (2005). I embrace her argument hat the distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories did not equate to places where the Constitution
applied in full and places where only its fundamental provisions applied. The conflicting opinions
throughout the Insular Cases, however, preclude a dispositive view.
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the exercise of its plenary powers, also enacted the Cooper Act
(Philippines) and the Foraker Act (Puerto Rico) to govern the new
territories.145 The distinguishing feature between the two is that the
Cooper Act contained a litany of provisions which included a word-for-
word copy of the Bill of Rights save for the rights to bear arms and to a
jury trial, 14 6 whereas the Foraker Act did not. This legal framework
nonetheless provided a similar setting to one that existed between the
federal government and the territories. No doubt, ideological and racial
considerations complicated the picture. 14 7 Arguably, if one could extend
the First Amendment or any other Bill of Rights provisions in that
setting between the federal government and the territories, a similar
situation also exists between the federal government and its overseas
colonies.
In Kepner v. United States, 14 8 a double jeopardy case on appeal
from the Philippine Supreme Court, he U.S. Supreme Court alluded to
this question when it held that "[i]t is not necessary to determine in this
case whether the jeopardy provision in the Bill of Rights would have
become part of the law of the islands without congressional
legislation."1 4 9 Unlike Puerto Rico, however, two years before the
Cooper Act, President McKinley issued his Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission,150 pursuant to his Article I powers as
commander in chief. McKinley's Instructions established a civil
government for the Philippine Islands and incorporated the Bill of
Rights, save for the two rights excepted in the Cooper Act. In fact, the
Cooper Act was a mere reproduction of the Instructions.15 1 But what
difference did the Instructions or the Cooper Act make insofar as the
application of the Bill of Rights was concerned in the unincorporated
Philippines Territory? The answer, as was the case in the incorporated
territories prior to 1898, was unclear. Kepner, though it was not clear
145. Cooper Act, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691 (1902); Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77
(1900).
146. Cooper Act § 5.
147. For a sampling of these considerations that affected U.S. views towards its new colonies,
see SUSAN K. HARRIS, GOD'S ARBITERS: AMERICANS AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1898-1902 (2011);
KRISTIN L. HOGANSON, FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN MANHOOD: How GENDER POLITICS PROVOKED
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN AND PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WARS (2000); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON,
BARBARIAN VIRTUES: THE UNITED STATES ENCOUNTERS FOREIGN PEOPLES AT HOME AND ABROAD,
1876-1917 (2003); PAUL KRAMER, THE BLOOD OF GOVERNMENT: RACE, EMPIRE, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE PHILIPPINES (2006).
148. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
149. Id. at 124.
150. WILLIAM McKINLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SECOND PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, reprinted
in REPORTS OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION 1 (1904), available at https://archive.org/stream/
reportsofphilippOOunit#page/n 19/mode/2up, archived at http://perma.cc/9RMZ-JP6L.
151. See Cooper Act §§ 1-87.
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from the record whether he was a U.S. citizen, 152 availed himself of
these rights through the Cooper Act; this put him in a position arguably
no different than that of George Reynolds in 1878.
I do not want to belabor this historical point any further. My only
claim is that a plausible, analogous state existed between the territories
and the colonies vis-A-vis the Bill of Rights. While it is true that the
Court had flatly stated in 1891 that the Constitution can never operate
in another country, 153 a fine line nevertheless existed insofar as states
and territories were concerned. Strictly speaking, the Bill of Rights has
already been applied and availed of extraterritorially outside the states.
And even if the record is not conclusive, it does not foreclose such an
argument either.
B. First Amendment Theory
This Section is concerned with extending the justifications and
purposes behind the First Amendment in support of an extraterritorial
First Amendment by simply recognizing that these purposes are
themselves location neutral. A clear recognition that such a right exists
outside the United States lessens the chilling effect that a state of
ambiguity might engender. After all, free speech violations are not only
about restraints but also about self-censorship. Those who say nothing
because of an ex ante fear of lacking any protections are as
unconstitutionally silenced as those who face subsequent punishment
for their utterances. This was certainly one of the central concerns of
the Court in its landmark decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.154
Since the emergence of modern First Amendment jurisprudence
in the early twentieth century, several justifications have been laid
down to undergird an American understanding of freedom of
expression. These various justifications revolve around three main
purposes: First, as elaborated in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's
celebrated dissent in Abrams v. United States,15 5 free speech protects
the "marketplace of ideas," which serves an important truth-seeking
role. The idea is that, if enough voices speak out freely enough, the
ultimate result would be our collective arrival at the truth. This truth-
seeking enterprise thus justifies freedom even for speech that people
152. Even if he was a Philippine citizen under the protection of the United States, pursuant
to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, such category was not considered "alien" under prevailing
American laws at the time.
153. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). The petitioner was aboard an American ship
docked in a Japanese harbor.
154. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
155. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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might find distasteful or abhorrent. Second, free speech is essential to
individual flourishing and autonomy. Under this view, speech that
expresses one's innermost self is generally entitled to constitutional
protection. The sentiment behind this purpose is best captured in
Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, where he poetically
waxed that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." 15 6 The speech need
not be purposive in any other sense that is not connected to self-
realization. But Cohen's infamous "Fuck the Draft" message on his
jacket as an antiwar message was obviously a political message as well.
And this brings us to the third main purpose behind the Speech Clause:
enhancing the democratic process. Speech as a mechanism for self-
governance, first elaborated on by legal theorist Alexander Meiklejohn
and elevated as constitutional law by the Court in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,157 focuses on the processes by which the people collectively
deliberate and decide on matters of public concern. In New York Times,
the Court, drawing from the Alien and Sedition Acts episode, held that
the central purpose of the First Amendment is to allow for democracy
to function properly, and criticism of official conduct must therefore
enjoy a strong constitutional shield. 158 The structural function of the
First Amendment as a means to facilitate self-governance has since
been teased out by scholars in many forms, especially its function as a
check against government power.159 It is also important to note that
these purposes often overlap in many speech cases.
The basic starting point of this discussion is, again, geography.
The strictly territorial frame with which we view the traditional speech
marketplace is woefully outdated.160 The staggering amount of
communications conducted over the Internet alone, which transcends
boundaries by its very nature, is a strong argument in favor of such
proposal. What is more, sticking close to these purposes and
justifications underlying the First Amendment is even more important
once we expand our view of the speech marketplace to encompass the
international stage as it would render intelligible certain problems that
are bound to come up in view of its yet-uncertain, but ever-expanding,
156. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
157. 376 U.S. 254; see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948).
158. 376 U.S. at 273.
159. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521.




contours.161 To be sure, expression that contributes to internal
democratic self-governance cannot be confined within the arbitrary
borders of sovereignty even if we concede that the First Amendment is
not meant to facilitate the flourishing of the entire world. 162 Similarly,
the value of counterspeech in the search of truth that the marketplace
metaphor protects is not limited by territory.
Consider a few examples illustrating how American speech
abroad serves these purposes. The now-iconic Black Power salute at the
1968 Olympics, made by American sprinters Tommie Smith and John
Carlos as they accepted their track medals to protest the abysmal state
of civil rights inside the United States, was made all the more powerful
because it was made on an international stage.163 For a more
contemporary example, we can look at an organization called American
Citizens Abroad, a private nonprofit organization that represents the
interests of U.S. citizens living outside the territorial United States164
and works mainly on issues such as absentee voting procedures and
taxation. They also conduct lobbying efforts to reform social security
and citizenship laws.165 These examples demonstrate that upholding
American ideals abroad clearly furthers self-governance ends.
More complicated is extraterritorial citizen speech that
implicates national security. As mentioned earlier, Philip Agee asserted
his First Amendment right to criticize the government as he divulged
the secret identities of fellow CIA agents stationed throughout Europe
and Latin America. 166 The Court held the speech-conduct distinction to
be crucial in striking down his challenge to the revocation of his
passport.167 Current headlines also provide fodder. The controversial
161. But see Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing for a focus on promoting
democratic culture, rather than the theory of Meiklejohnian democratic deliberation is appropriate
for the Internet age).
162. Robert D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports ofIdeas: First Amendment Issues, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 863, 868 (1985) ("Assisting foreign nationals to find truth, however, is not a first
amendment goal."). Nor is assisting foreign nationals to find truth a goal of the Constitution in
general for that matter. See generally J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a
Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007) (arguing against conferring constitutional protections
to aliens outside the United States).
163. Both athletes were expelled from the Games, but the image became one of the most
graphic icons of black protest in U.S. history. For background, see Gary Younge, The Man Who
Raised a Black Power Salute at the 1968 Olympic Games, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2012), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/30/black-power-salute- 1968-olympics, archived at http://
perma.cc/K8XA-US26.
164. The Mission of ACA, Inc., AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD, http://americansabroad.org/
about/mission-statement/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TXK2-FG2H.
165. Id.
166. Haigv. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 287 (1981).
167. Id. at 305.
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whistleblower Edward Snowden could possibly invoke the First
Amendment if he chooses to challenge the broad provisions of the
Espionage Act, under which he would be tried if he sets foot on U.S.
soil. 168 The journalist Glenn Greenwald, who first broke the Snowden
revelations and who resides in Brazil, should also be able to do just
that.169 The claim, however, is not that recognizing that First
Amendment protections go beyond national borders would
automatically trump any competing government interest, but hat it is
a requisite first step nonetheless.
An extraterritorial First Amendment serves all these rationales
behind freedom of expression. The extraterritorial aspect is present
with regard to the First Amendment interests of both speakers and
listeners. In other words, it concerns not only citizens wanting to speak
abroad but arguably includes their right to receive information from
abroad as well. This is part and parcel of what is essential for the
formation of a well-informed citizenry. In Lamont v. Postmaster
General,170 the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory provision that
required the Postmaster General to detain and deliver only upon an
affirmative request from the addressee unsealed materials of
"communist political propaganda" arriving from abroad. Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas held that the act was an unconstitutional
restriction on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's right to free
speech, an unconscionable attack on the "uninhibited, robust and wide-
open debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First
Amendment."171 A similar ground was also behind the Court's ruling in
Reno v. ACLU, 172 where the Court struck down the anti-indecency
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 because the
provision also suppressed protected speech. The decision, the first that
dealt with the changed social conditions of communication brought
about by the advent of Internet technologies, recognized the
governmental interest in protecting children and minors from harmful
materials but concluded that the restrictions unduly burdened the right
168. See, e.g., Christina Wells, Edward Snowden, the Espionage Act and First Amendment
Concerns, JURIST (July 29, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/07/christina-wells-snowden-
espionage.php, archived at http://perma.cc/NY53-CFV8.
169. Timothy B. Lee, Could Glenn Greenwald Go to Jail? The Law Is Alarmingly Murky,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/Wonkblog/Wp/2013/06/26/
could-glenn-greenwald-go-to-j ail-the-law-is-alarmingly-murky/, archived at http://perma.cc/
8BRD-E4C4.
170. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
171. Id. at 307.
172. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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of adults to receive information and address one another in this novel
medium.173
The Court has not treated both speaker and listener dimensions
of the First Amendment equally, however. Ideological exclusions
through visa denials illustrate the shaky foundations of a listener-
oriented approach. 174Under current doctrine, the denial of a visa to an
alien invited by citizens to speak on a matter of public concern was not
a violation of the First Amendment rights of those who had invited him
since the admission of aliens is an instance of the plenary power of
Congress, which the Court deems itself incompetent to adjudicate. 175
In addition to the three existing rationales that have been
exclusively developed in a domestic environment, it might be the case
that, as Professor Timothy Zick argues, a new theoretical justification
has to be found and accordingly underlie an extraterritorial First
Amendment.1 7 6 Perhaps we need another justification why citizens
should have a strong First Amendment interest to associate with
foreign speakers and audiences, especially outside the United States,
and why foreign speakers should have access to the First Amendment
when they have been subjected to the exercise of U.S. government
power. Jack Balkin, for instance, argues that the Meiklejohnian self-
governance rationale is inadequate in view of the changed social
conditions of the modern information society.177 But his proposed
"democratic culture" justification, with its emphasis on the
participatory nature of freedom of expression in the age of the Internet,
is too tethered to speech uttered within its technological
infrastructure. 178 As I have shown above, too much speech today still
occurs outside the Internet for the self-governance rationale to be
173. Id. at 875.
174. See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the denial
of a visa to an individual who endorsed and espoused terrorist activity); see also Nusrat
Choudhury, Banned from America for Political Views?, ACLU BLOG (Nov. 19, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/banned-america-political-views, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q5VQ-YY6G (detailing the U.S. State Department's nineteen-month delay in granting a
visa to Kerim Yildiz, an London-based advocate of Kurdish human rights). In addition, previous
high-profile personalities initially denied visas included academics Adam Habib and Tariq
Ramadan. In 2010, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lifted the visa restrictions on Habib
and Ramadan.
175. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
176. The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective, supra note 9, at 945 ("Those
justifications do not expressly contemplate a world in which speech and associations frequently
transcend territorial borders."); id. at 998-1023 (describing what a cosmopolitan view of the First
Amendment would look like).
177. Balkin, supra note 161.
178. Id. at 3.
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discarded. It is probably the case that we need self-governance in
addition to, rather than in place of, any of the existing justifications.
Zick's cosmopolitan approach, on the other hand, though not a
justification in itself, serves as a reminder of the First Amendment's
cosmopolitan origins and, as a normative matter, its future trajectory.
This approach looks outward and adopts a more global perspective with
regard to expressive freedoms consistent with U.S. obligations and core
First Amendment values.179 Zick observes that "[n]o one has yet
endeavored to develop a theory or justification that applies specifically
to trans-border First Amendment liberties."180
In my view, however, the existing individual flourishing, self-
governance, and search for truth concerns are general enough to
accommodate speech that occurs beyond U.S. borders. As Zick himself
notes, these rationales are already susceptible to a cosmopolitan
interpretation.181 The underlying problem Zick identifies is not that
these values are inadequate but that they are interpreted in a
consistently provincial manner. But even under a view of the First
Amendment that strictly focuses on its domestic benefits, 182 any
interaction between citizens and aliens, in both its listener-oriented and
speaker-oriented models, would always come up with a redounding
benefit to the American speech marketplace. The question turns on the
degree of protection we should accord to the citizen's right to be the
speaker and listener and whether one is more protected than the other
whenever alien speakers or foreign audiences are involved.
IV. COVERAGE
A. Aliens and Citizens
Given that the First Amendment can be invoked outside U.S.
borders, who can claim it? Notwithstanding globalization's relentless
assault on the nation-state and century-old predictions of the latter's
inevitable demise,183 ours still remain very much a state-centered
179. The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective, supra note 9, at 996.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1000.
182. Kamenshine, supra note 162; see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict
of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2017, 2067 n.237 (2005) ("I believe that, as the
Preamble suggests, the Constitution is concerned with America and Americans, and the extension
of rights to foreigners (wherever they are located) must therefore be justified by some domestic
consequence.").
183. One can start with IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH
(1795). For a taste of contemporary literature on the topic, see, for example, Peter F. Drucker, The
Global Economy and the Nation-State, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 159 (1997); Masao Miyoshi, A Borderless
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international system. Consequently, distinctions among rights-bearing
persons as citizens and aliens within a particular sovereign territory
retain their legal, political, and moral purchase. Alien claims within a
land not their own are balanced, even negotiated, on a "terrain flanked
by human rights on the one hand and sovereignty assertions, on the
other."1 84 Within the U.S. constitutional system, the long history of that
shifting terrain dates back to the 1798 crisis over the Alien and Sedition
Acts. As previously discussed, rampant nativism owing to fears that
French saboteurs were lurking to destroy the fledgling republic from
within had produced the two statutes relating to alien friends and
enemies.R5 What Madison's 1800 Report made clear is that resident
aliens, insofar as they owe temporary allegiance to the state (and are
not nationals of a state in a declared war with the United States),
should be entitled to the protections and advantages offered by the
Constitution. This does not seem to be a controversial claim. The
question is at which point do these protections and advantages attach,
and how strong are they compared to those available to citizens?
As we have seen in Kleindienst v. Mandel,186 Congress exercises
plenary powers with regard to the admission of aliens prior to their
arrival on U.S. soil. 187 Thus, in that case, no constitutional rights
existed either for Mandel, a Belgian-Marxist academic and nonresident
alien who was invited to speak at various U.S. universities, or for the
U.S. citizens who have invited him.188 But once aliens have been
admitted into the country, either as temporary sojourners or permanent
residents, generally speaking, they enjoy First Amendment
protections. 189 Hence, a permanent resident in the United States who
was once affiliated with the Communist Party of the United States
could not be summarily deported without due process.190 In this
instance, the Bill of Rights operates precisely to countervail even
World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State, 19 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 726 (1993); Dani Rodrik, Who Needs the Nation State?, 89 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 1 (2013).
184. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 47 (2004).
185. STONE, supra note 128, at 28-29.
186. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
187. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904)
(holding that aliens cannot challenge their own exclusion on First Amendment grounds because
they do not belong as citizens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (holding that
the power to exclude aliens is to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government
because it is inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations,
and vital to defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers).
188. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765.
189. Al-Aqeelv. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69-70 (D.D.C. 2008).
190. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ("Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens
residing in this country.").
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Congress's plenary powers, including that of deportation. However, this
does not mean that the First Amendment prevents the expulsion of
aliens in cases where it is proven, for example, that he had knowingly
joined an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the U.S.
government.191 But at the least, it guarantees them access to courts as
well as the privilege of litigation. The extent of constitutional
protections for resident aliens was recently questioned in Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee ("AADC"). 192 AADC
involved a complaint about selective deportation owing to aliens, both
legal and illegal, with affiliations with politically unpopular foreign
groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.193
Although the gist of the decision was on a jurisdictional issue, Justice
Scalia also took the occasion to state that "[w]hen an alien's continuing
presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the
Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the
additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization
that supports terrorist activity."19 4 The Court's language did not
distinguish between legal and illegal aliens, even though both were
subject to deportation proceedings in that particular case. Critics of the
decision drew attention to the decision's chilling effects vis-A-vis aliens
residing lawfully within the United States, who would now be reluctant
to exercise their First Amendment freedoms for fear of possible
expulsion.19 5
Suffice it to say, the spectrum of rights theoretically available to
both citizens and aliens within the United States is an entire debate by
itself. From the previous Section, we have established that an
extraterritorial First Amendment more than plausibly exists with
regard to U.S. citizens. The more difficult question, however, and the
focus of this Section, revolves around the First Amendment claims of
nonresident aliens outside the United States. Antiglobalist literature on
the broader topic often begins with an invocation of the Preamble, "We
the People of the United States . . . ," to cabin the reach of the
Constitution's protections to the people within the national
community.196 In Verdugo-Urquidez, for instance, Chief Justice
191. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
192. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
193. Id. at 473.
194. Id. at 491-92.
195. See, e.g., David Cole, Damage Control? A Comment on Professor Neuman's Reading of
Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 347 (1999); Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment
After Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?,
35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (2000).
196. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 162.
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Rehnquist defined those who were deemed covered by the Fourth
Amendment (while also mentioning the First and Second Amendments)
as "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community."197 Invoking the earlier precedent
of Johnson v. Eisentrager,198 where the Court also rejected any
application of Fifth Amendment protections to aliens held in a German
prison, the Verdugo-Urquidez majority noted that "[t]he practice of
every modern government is opposed to it."199
What could be the reasons for such opposition? If the freedom of
expression is a fundamental norm crucial to all democratic societies,
why not extend the First Amendment even to nonresident aliens? As
Professor Gerald Neuman wrote, various normative visions underlie
prevailing rules.200 And these normative visions characterize the
interpretive choices, though mostly in accord with existing precedent,
which court decisions have taken. Commentators have generally
enumerated these visions as follows: universalism, membership,
mutuality of obligations, and functional approach.201 The American
constitutional tradition, from the cases thus far discussed, has largely
oscillated among the last three. Both Verdugo-Urquidez and
Eisentrager epresent the membership approach, in that rights were
extended only to the people considered belonging to the polity. This
could refer to both citizens and aliens, provided the latter exhibit
sufficient connections.202 The Eisentrager Court in particular put the
government's obligation to protect as corresponding with the allegiance
of the citizen.203 Noting that aliens' presence within a territory is the
significant factor in triggering the Court's power to act,204 the
implication is that aliens outside the territory, by definition, are
197. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
198. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
199. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269.
200. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 913, 976. ("The question of
scope must be resolved primarily by deliberative choice among alternative approaches on the basis
of their normative characteristics and their coherence with less unsettled constitutional
practices.")
201. For a fuller account of each in such lists (and their overlap), see STRANGERS, supra note
3; THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 9; Jos6 A Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal
Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J.
1660, 1664-70 (2009); Keitner, supra note 21; Roosevelt, supra note 182, at 2042-59.
202. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950);
203. Id.
204. Id. at 771.
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without judicial recourse.205 It should be noted that Eisentrager was
categorized as an enemy, and the extent to which the enemy status
matters for claiming First Amendment protections will be discussed
later in the context of War on Terror detainees held in Guantanamo Bay
prison.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez, on the other
hand, encapsulates what Neuman has termed as a "mutuality of
obligations" approach.206 Brennan questioned the majority assertion
that aliens should have sufficient connections with the United States in
order to come within the purview of the Constitution.207 Concluding
that constitutional restraints and corresponding individual rights
should travel with the government's insistence on compliance with U.S.
laws, "[m]utuality is essential to ensure the fundamental fairness that
underlies our Bill of Rights," he reasoned.208 In fact, his view of
constitutional rights as a structural restraint on government action
specifically invoked the centuries-old notion of mutuality present in
Madison's 1800 Report. In addition, Justice Brennan regarded the
mutuality approach as essential for both principled and pragmatic
reasons: ignoring the Constitution whenever aliens are concerned
disregards that "[o]ur national interest is defined by those values,"209
and that, "lawlessness breeds lawlessness" and exposes U.S. citizens to
the same kind of treatment from other sovereign nations. In DKT, then-
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg also asserted the same rationale for
extending constitutional protection to the claims of foreign NGOs.210
Indeed, in a number of cases, courts have recognized
extraterritorial constitutional claims of aliens when it involved the
seizure of property located inside the United States. For instance, in
205. This theory also underlies other cases although they all involve aliens not yet admitted
into the U.S. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (holding that the Bill of Rights is
a futile authority for alien seeking admission).
206. Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 3.
207. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (Brennan J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 285-86 ("For over 200 years, our country has considered itself the world's foremost
protector of liberties. The privacy and sanctity of the home have been primary tenets of our moral,
philosophical, and judicial beliefs.").
210. DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307-08. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting):
If our land is one "of freedom, of equal opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of good
will for other peoples who share our aspirations," it is in no small measure so because
our Constitution restrains all officialdom from infringing on fundamental human
rights; just as our flag 'carries its message ... both at home and abroad," so does our
Constitution and the values it expresses.
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 437 (1989)).
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United States v. Demanett,211 the Third Circuit recognized that both
American citizens and Colombian nationals were entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections when their shipping vessel was seized off the
coast of Delaware.212 At the very least, in some circumstances,
nonresident aliens are also accorded Article III standing to challenge
government actions in court.213 One can also view U.S. v. Tiede along
these lines. 214 The case involved an alien accused of hijacking a Polish
aircraft and stood trial in a U.S. court for violating German law. The
Berlin court, created by the U.S. government to serve the American
sector of West Berlin, held that the U.S. Constitution applied to the
proceedings, and, therefore, the defendants before the court were
entitled to constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial.2 15 In
all these cases, the view of constitutional rights takes on the character
of a restraint on the exercise of government power.
And there lies the precise novelty of Boumediene. This case is
the middle-way proposition that, although aliens do not have any
presence or even property within the United States, they might
nonetheless be entitled to claim constitutional protections.216 While the
Court repudiated Verdugo-Urquidez in holding that aliens do not have
any rights claims outside the United States, it did not swing the
pendulum back all the way to the position of the dissent either. Instead,
Justice Kennedy's functionalist concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez
became the new law. In a nutshell, the current regime appears to be as
follows: Citizens can invoke their constitutional rights outside the
United States, subject to the caveat in the Harlan/Frankfurter
concurrence in Reid and reiterated in Boumediene that practical
considerations would allow such exercise. Aliens, on the other hand, can
211. 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262
(5th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (holding nonresident aliens are protected
by Due Process Clause with regard to actions taken against their property rights).
212. Demanett, 629 F.2d at 864.
213. Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that Article III permits foreign
plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts under some circumstances). But see DKT, 887 F.2d at 285 ("We will
not, however, hold as the government urges, that an alien beyond the bounds of the United States
never has standing to assert a constitutional claim.").
214. 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
215. Id. at 243-44.
216. For various complaints, see, for example, Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf and the
Court's Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 104-15, 124-32 (2011); Kent, supra
note 162, at 505-38 (arguing that constitutional protections were not intended to protect
noncitizens outside of the United States); Posner, supra note 58, at 8-18. Even supporters of the
decision in Boumediene were surprised. See David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 49 ("[T]he Government had
precedent on its side.").
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claim the benefits of these constitutional rights, regardless of their
location, provided they have been subject to an exercise of U.S.
government power, the situation involves a fundamental right, and
finally, it would not be "impracticable and anomalous" to do so. The
privileged position occupied by practicality in the application of the
Constitution abroad insofar as aliens are concerned seems to be the
clear message from the Boumediene majority opinion.217
The prevailing framework on extraterritorial rights currently
embodies the three theoretical approaches previously mentioned. But
notwithstanding the appearance of parity with regard to the
extraterritorial rights of citizens and aliens, the latter's rights
concededly stand on shakier ground than those of citizens. And those
who subscribe to the membership approach believe that this is as it
should be. The starting point of any analysis for citizens is the fact of
their citizenship. Aliens' claims, on the other hand, begin with
practicality. And as the dissents in Boumediene noted,218 considerations
of practicality are hardly of assistance to government officials in
determining whether constitutional limitations should attach. Further,
one can also argue that Boumediene should be limited to cases involving
the Suspension Clause, given the extraordinary circumstances
surrounding the setup of post-9/11 Guantanamo Bay as an offshore
detention center.219 But the text of the decision did not give any hint in
favor of such a limited application.
Nonetheless, ambiguities still remain. I should note the
distinction between, in 1798-esque terms, alien friends and alien
enemies and the distinction that Boumediene makes, if any. For
example, Boumediene does not answer the question whether other
rights, such as the First Amendment, would attach to friendly aliens
not in custody of the U.S. government. The Insular Cases remain a place
to start. Even if one accepts the conventional view that it created a
217. This view has been followed by lower courts. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp.
2d 205, 228 (D.C. Circ. 2009) (denying same treatment to those detained in Bagram Air Force base
is in Afghanistan because it was an active war zone), order rev'd, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
218. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 839-40 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. For example, there is language in Eisentrager that distinguished among rights. See
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950):
If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world, except Americans engaged
in defending it, the same must be true of the companion civil-rights Amendments for
none of them is limited by its express terms, territorially or as to persons. Such a
construction would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy
elements, guerrilla fighters and werewolves could require the American judiciary to
assure them freedoms of speech and press and assembly as in the First Amendment,
right to bear arms as in the Second, security against "unreasonable" searches and




distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories to the
extent that only fundamental rights apply to the latter, that bifurcation
still acknowledges that some rights apply nevertheless to noncitizens
who are outside traditional U.S. borders. These noncitizens are clearly
nonenemy aliens. But that only speaks to territories that have been or
are still, in some form or another, linked to the United States and whose
inhabitants have been or are accorded status as citizens or noncitizen
nationals. What about fully extraterritorial claims of friendly aliens? At
this point, it is helpful to bring the First Amendment cases previously
discussed in dialogue with the foregoing extraterritoriality cases.
An extraterritorial First Amendment right has generally been
recognized by courts in the past, either explicitly or implicitly, in favor
of citizens, although it is often subject to national security requirements
or foreign affairs considerations. This comports with the
Frankfurter/Harlan concurrences in Reid, which hold that "there are
provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all
circumstances in every foreign place."2 20 One can see this principle at
work in the DKT case, in which the majority opinion proceeded to
analyze the merits of the claim of DKT even though it was subsequently
struck down. Even the dissent of then-Judge Ginsburg focused on the
indirect curtailment of the extraterritorial rights of the affected
domestic entity rather than the extraterritorial free speech claims of
the foreign NGOs even though the USAID rules directly regulated their
speech, not speech of the domestic NGOs'. More recently, in Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Department of the Treasury, a case
involving facts very similar to that in Holder, the Ninth Circuit
nonetheless upheld the First Amendment claim of Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation because the latter was a domestic entity, albeit a branch of
a larger international organization.2 2 1
Aliens, on the other hand, have not been granted any
extraterritorial First Amendment rights. Prior to Boumediene, the only
cases that allowed friendly aliens to invoke constitutional protections
were those involving property that was located either in the U.S. or
abroad and had been affected or seized through acts of the U.S.
government. In a way, Boumediene can be cast continuously in this vein
as well. Instead of the detainees' property, their own persons have been
seized, and this action gave them the necessary opening to invoke the
Constitution despite their status as enemy aliens. One additional
explanation for this state of affairs is that Justice Kennedy's opinion
220. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 76 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 41
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
221. 660 F.3d 1019, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2011).
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made the application of the Suspension Clause to the detainees not
simply a matter of individual rights but a crucial component in
maintaining the separation of powers underlying the American system
of government.222 However, free speech is a core American value that
is, as noted, about more than self-expression. It is more fundamentally
about self-governance. Free speech, therefore, possesses the same
importance as a right to habeas, though there are different dynamics
involved.
Insofar as extraterritorial First Amendment claims of enemy
aliens is concerned, it appears that the door is clearly shut, and there
are few reasons available to keep it open for political reasons. That is
why it was odd that the court in al Bahlul had to engage in a hedged
analysis of whether the First Amendment applies. At best, al Bahlul
could be given the same treatment as the Boumediene detainees insofar
as access to a judicial forum is concerned, and this was what he already
got through the hearings before the Court of Military Commission
Review.
In order to invoke the First Amendment, friendly aliens should
be able to reach an analogous threshold, either in the form of some type
of presence in a U.S.-governed territory or through some act of the
government. In Neuman's article about the broader implications of
Boumediene, he addressed this First Amendment scenario head-on and
gave the example of the U.S. government subsidizing a pro-American
political party in a foreign election.223 He is right to conclude that such
situation alone would not give rise to any colorable speech claim by an
alien. In fact, the Obama Administration has made the promotion of
freedom of expression abroad, in both offline and online forms, one of
the important cornerstones of its foreign policy.224 If, for one reason or
another, aliens do not like what the U.S. government is doing in their
own countries, it is highly unlikely that they can challenge those
policies by invoking the First Amendment. Hence, one can, at best,
simply caution the U.S. government to be more sensitive to foreign
cultures. Suppose a friendly alien (in the sense that he or she has not
been designated as an enemy combatant) who is a vocal critic of U.S.
222. Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 765-66.
223. Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 3, at 287.
224. James Glanz and John Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/S699-6ULN; Suzanne Nossel, Freedom Begins at Home,
archived at http://perma.cc/V74K-5MJS; Hilary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks on
Internet Freedom at the Newseum, Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), available at




foreign policy-say, Julian Assange of Wikileaks-was somehow
arrested by U.S. authorities for leaking classified material. Assange
and his organization, Wikileaks, were not located in the United States
when the high-profile 2010 leaks involving the "Collateral Murder"
video, was released. And yet it could not be disputed that the First
Amendment was implicated and could be invoked by Assange and other
relevant individuals.225 A less dramatic example might be a Pakistani
national protesting U.S. drone policy outside the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad. In such cases, he or she should be able to invoke the First
Amendment in case he is arrested by American security officers.226 In
both scenarios, as with the foregoing cases discussed, to say that the
First Amendment could be invoked does not foreclose any appropriate
legal proceeding, nor does it automatically trump any competing
interest of the government.
B. Zones of Application
The twenty-five-year-old Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law states that the Constitution generally controls U.S.
government conduct in its foreign relations and generally limits its
authority whether it is exercised in the U.S. or abroad.227 But as the
reporters' note also states,228 the Constitution does not speak about the
rights of aliens in places not within the de jure sovereignty of the United
States. A structural view of constitutional rights as restraints that
travel alongside the exercise of government power, much less one that
can be claimed by even noncitizens, is a recent innovation. As Professor
David Cole wrote, Boumediene "fits quite comfortably within an
important transnational trend of recent years in which courts of last
resort have played an increasingly aggressive role in reviewing (and
225. What is contested is whether Assange himself qualifies for First Amendment protection
as a journalist and whether he was merely the recipient of such leaked information or complicit in
the leak, in which case he would be liable for conspiracy charges. For a more detailed analysis of
the Wikileaks case, see Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over
the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REV. 311 (2011).
226. There are complicating factors in this scenario, such as the jurisdiction of local law
enforcement and the fact that he might be subjected to local laws in which case the First
Amendment is not available.
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 (1987):
The provisions of the United States Constitution safeguarding individual rights
generally control the United States government in the conduct of its foreign relations
as well as in domestic matters, and generally limit governmental authority whether it
is exercised in the United States or abroad, and whether such authority is exercised
unilaterally or by international agreement.
228. See id. § 722, reporters' note 16.
2014] 1415
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
invalidating) security measures that trench on individual rights."2 29 If
the contemporaneous wrangling over the Insular Cases was any
indication, even at the height of the U.S. experiment with formal empire
at the turn of century, extraterritoriality of laws (which includes the
Constitution) was, for a long time, the exception, not the norm.
The dissenters in Boumediene castigated the majority opinion as
an instance of inappropriate judicial activism, but they did not address
one of the crucial factors in the majority's analysis: the character of the
Guantanamo Bay base itself.230 There were good reasons why
constitutional rights have been traditionally restricted in terms of
geography. Sovereignty is one of such reasons. The Westphalian system
served an important purpose of preserving peace and order in an
otherwise anarchic international system. An extraterritorial reach of
one state's laws necessarily results in an encroachment of another
state's domain. In addition, until recently, individuals were, for the
most part, not considered subjects of any international protection
outside their own nation-states. However, even with our contemporary
state-centric international system, our notion of sovereignty has
changed dramatically in the last twenty years alone.231 National
borders are more permeable, and international human rights law has
made incursions into what were deemed to be issues of traditional state
prerogative.
Notwithstanding this changed context, the character of a
territory still matters for purposes of determining the application of
extraterritorial constitutional rules including the First Amendment.
Thus, for example, we now have a seemingly anomalous ituation of a
U.S. citizen guaranteed a right to jury trial in Japan, a foreign country
but not in Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory of the United
States.232 This is also the key factor in the functionalist approach of
Boumediene, which is encapsulated in the "impracticable and
229. Cole, supra note 216, at 51; see, e.g., In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d
85 (D.D.C. 2007).
230. For a general history of the base, see JONATHAN M. HANSEN, GUANTANAMO: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2011).
231. See generally SAVIUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010)
(describing the role of recent developments in international law in protecting individual human
rights).
232. However, the jury trial in Reid was conducted inside an American military base located
in Japan. Cf. Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 43-44, (D.P.R. 2008)
(holding that the Bill of Rights applies in full within Puerto Rico). Note this was after Boumediene.
None of the appellate courts have yet affirmed this district court decision. See also King v. Andrus,
452 F. Supp. 11, 16-17 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding that the right to jury trial applies in American
Samoa, a similarly unincorporated territory).
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anomalous" standard. The standard,233 whether taken conjunctively or
disjunctively, refers to two different things. "Impracticable" is
sometimes used interchangeably in lower courts and even by the
Supreme Court itself with the term "impractical."234 This word connotes
difficulty of implementation or such a substantial degree of
inconvenience that it makes the likelihood of success in realizing such
a right very low. In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy emphasized this
when he concluded that "there are few practical barriers to the running
of the writ." 235 Under this prong, one should also count the relevant
foreign policy and diplomatic interests of the U.S. government. In
deciding the constitutionality of a restriction that limits land purchases
to the indigenous inhabitants of Northern Marianas, the Ninth Circuit
pointed out that the absence of such a restriction would "hamper the
United States' ability to form political alliances and acquire necessary
military outposts."236 "Anomalous," on the other hand, connotes
incongruity, a wrong fit between the right and the culture of the place
where it is sought to be claimed. In In re Guantanamo Detainees,237 the
D.C. District Court held that there would be nothing impracticable and
anomalous in
recognizing that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the fundamental right to due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment. American authorities are in full control at
Guantanamo Bay, their activities are immune from Cuban law, and there are few or no
significant remnants of native Cuban culture or tradition remaining that can interfere
with the implementation of an American system ofjustice.2 3 8
A concern for the preservation of, or noninterference with, local culture
is the main reason why this particular prong is also usually highlighted
in cases involving the application of constitutional rights in various U.S.
unincorporated territories such as Guam, American Samoa, and the
Mariana Islands.239
233. For a detailed exegesis of the standard, see Merriam, supra note 57, at 204-37.
234. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) ("In cases involving foreign
citizens detained abroad by the Executive, it likely would be both an impractical and
unprecedented extension ofjudicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be available at the
moment the prisoner is taken into custody.").
235. Id. at 770.
236. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Equal
Protection clause did not apply to Northern Mariana Islands).
237. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) order vacated, Al Odah v. U.S., 559 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
238. Id. at 463.
239. See, e.g., Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (9th Cir. 1990):
It would truly be anomalous to construe the equal protection clause to force the United
States to break its pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and property . .. the Bill
of Rights was not ... intended to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures.
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To be sure, the origins of the standard were admittedly colonial
in nature. For example, the U.S. colonial government did not apply the
right to jury trial in the Philippines and Puerto Rico because the
Filipinos and Puerto Ricans were deemed to be racially unfit and
incapable of fulfilling the responsibilities that the right entailed.240 But
as its appearance in the various Guantanamo cases in the past decade
show, its application is no longer confined to unincorporated territories.
And even insofar as these unincorporated territories are concerned, a
uniform application of the Constitution could indeed be a recipe for
cultural decimation.241 Further, the walls of state sovereignty might be
permeable now, but they still stand nonetheless. An extraterritorial
application of constitutional rights thus cannot be indiscriminately
rigid without due regard for the facts on the ground, including
encroachment on the sovereignty of another country. This very
flexibility, though, is both an advantage and a source of concern.
Scholars such as Neuman and Christina Duffy Ponsa criticize the
standard for its indeterminacy.2 4 2 However courts decide to implement
this standard, the analysis would have to begin with the place and the
pertinent facts surrounding the location. This was certainly the key
factor in Eisentrager (Allied prison in postwar Germany) as well as
Boumediene (prison in Guantanamo Bay under de facto U.S. authority
despite Cuban de jure sovereignty).2 43
Those pertinent facts are also related to the right sought to be
claimed. As Neuman observed, the exercise of a negative First
Amendment right is different from the positive right to a jury trial or
suspension of the writ of habeas.244 The former is largely an act of
governmental restraint while the latter rights involve affirmative
duties and concrete practical obligations on the part of the government,
Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the right
ofjury trial did not extend to the Mariana Islands).
240. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 136 (2004).
241. See, e.g., Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation i Pacific Islands: Still a Good
Idea-and Constitutional, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 331, 332 (2005).
242. See Burnett, supra note 3, at 981-82, 1026 (noting that the standard asks the wrong
questions and should be abandoned); Merriam, supra note 57, at 173-74 (proposing a comparative
constitutional guide to interpret the standard); Neuman, supra note 61, at 365 (proposing that
international human rights law be used as a guide in the standard's application).
243. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 763 (2008):
But there are critical differences between Landsberg Prison, circa 1950, and the United
States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay in 2008. Unlike its present control over the
naval station, the United States' control over the prison in Germany was neither
absolute nor indefinite. Like all parts of occupied Germany, the prison was under the
jurisdiction of the combined Allied Forces.
244. Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 3, at 287-88 (providing a brief reflection on how
the functional approach would impact the First Amendment).
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such as providing for the logistics of conducting habeas proceedings,
even though both may have similar foreign affairs implications. For
instance, in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy gave three relevant factors
in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship
and status of the detainee; (2) the nature of the sites where
apprehension and detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles
inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. 2 45
An analogous set of criteria also applies with respect to an
extraterritorial First Amendment, including the citizenship or status of
the speaker, the place where the speech was uttered, the intended
audience of the speech, and the location of the person's detention and
trial, if applicable. The place of the speech could be an unincorporated
U.S. territory or a foreign nation-state. In either case, the functionalist
evaluation would definitively include the probable impact on the local
culture as well as the relevant foreign policy or diplomatic interest of
the U.S. government. Such interest is probably more significant in
degree when the location at issue is an independent foreign country
because of the international implications. But this balancing or
contextualization is not unusual in First Amendment jurisprudence;
there are already varying treatments of speech in different contexts
even within the United States. For instance, there is a considerably
lower degree of free speech rights in schools or within government
institutions.246 Hence, the analysis would be slightly different if
Assange were arrested in the United Kingdom instead of Puerto Rico.
U.S. NGOs who want to provide legal training and human rights
orientation for members of, say, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in
the Philippines, an organization ot included on the State Department's
Foreign Terrorist Organization ("FTO") list, should be able to do so in
Manila or in Guam. If a First Amendment claim were to arise, the court
should be able to consider these locational differences accordingly.
The distinct characteristics of the place in which speech is
uttered is a factor in that the "impracticable and anomalous" standard
plays a most significant role even as existing First Amendment
doctrines are transposed to the extraterritorial realm. And that makes
a difference, especially if one is an alien claiming U.S. constitutional
protections. As I previously argued, the practicality of enforcing the
right is the most important factor with regard to alien claims. It matters
for citizens too, since constitutional provisions are not always applicable
245. 553 U.S. at 766.
246. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding that the First Amendment does
not prevent educators from suppressing student speech in school-supervised events); Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (holding that government employee speech is subject to
regulation if made pursuant to their duties).
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everywhere pursuant to Reid and Boumediene. Oddly enough, this is
also the most overlooked factor in recent cases where an extraterritorial
First Amendment has been implicitly recognized (e.g., Holder and
USAID); this is the very gap this Article seeks to bring to judicial and
academic attention.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Now that we have a plausible case that an extraterritorial First
Amendment should exist, what are the broader implications of
recognizing this? Thus far, what seems to be consistent from the
foregoing discussion is that a First Amendment claim, more so
extraterritorially than not, is always balanced against other
considerations. In the extraterritorial context, the primary competing
factor is the government's foreign affairs or diplomatic concerns. The
Cold War era cases on expressive travel and association are the best
examples to highlight this primordial clash of interests, although the
specter of terrorism has now taken the place of Communism as the
prime evil that the U.S. government guards against. Within this foreign
affairs sphere, the government, particularly the executive branch,
enjoys the highest degree of flexibility and deference from other
branches of government. Courts in particular recognize this special
competence through the political question and act of state doctrines.247
Recognizing an extraterritorial First Amendment, both for citizens and,
under some circumstances, aliens, necessarily makes an incursion into
this area, and in most cases, resolving these questions could only be
achieved through appropriate balancing. In this last Part, I compare
and contrast the Supreme Court's analyses in its Holder and USAID
decisions in light of the extraterritorial nature of the speech claims
raised by the U.S. NGOs involved in these cases. Specifically, I analyze
the weight given to the foreign policy consideration of the government
in each case.
A. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
Holder was the culmination of a tortuous litigation spanning a
twelve-year procedural history. In 1996, in the aftermath of the
247. The political question and act of state doctrines are judicially developed doctrines that
allow courts to decline judgment of a foreign sovereign's acts, thus decreasing possible conflicts
with the political branches of government. The former focuses on the character of the controversy
while that latter is contingent on its location. For the earliest enunciations of the political question
doctrine and act of state doctrine, respectively, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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Oklahoma bombings, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). 248 Section 2339B of AEDPA249 prohibits
the provision of material support to FTOs as designated by the
Secretary of State. It also included a finding, which the Court would
rely on in its decision, that "foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct."2 50 The
material support statute was intended to address the problem of
terrorist groups raising money under the cover of humanitarian aid.
Notably, it did not include any requirement that the support be linked
to a violent act of the group in question.
Two U.S. citizens and six domestic NGOs challenged the statute
in 1998 on First Amendment grounds, stating that it violated their
freedoms of speech and association since it did not require the
government to prove that they had a "specific intent to further the
unlawful ends of those organizations."251 After 9/11, the PATRIOT Act
added the term "expert advice or assistance" as covered by the term
"material support."252 HLP had been working with the PKK and the
LTTE, both FTOs, even before the enactment of AEDPA. Specifically, it
was encouraging the PKK to resolve its dispute with the Turkish
government through peaceful and lawful means.253 In particular, it was
training PKK members to file human rights complaints before the
United Nations, to inform the Kurds of their international human
rights and remedies, and to advise them on peaceful conflict
resolution.254 It also assisted the LTTE, which was defeated by the Sri
Lankan government in 2009, in peacefully advocating for the rights of
Tamils within Sri Lanka outside the country.
248. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012):
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person
must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as
defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section
140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
250. § 301(a)(7); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7 (2010).
251. Holder, 561 U.S. at 11.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 13.




The Court upheld the constitutionality of the material support
statute.255 Doctrinally and practically speaking, the decision does not
seem to make much sense. Distinguishing between independent and
coordinated advocacy, it held that the prohibition only applies to the
latter.256 Thus, the NGOs are still as free to do the exact same activities
they have been doing, except that they cannot do so in coordination with
foreign groups that they know to be FTOs. However, as Justice Breyer
argued in his vigorous dissent that, if the government's main concern
was that coordinated activity would confer legitimacy to these
organizations and consequently enable them to raise funds, recruit
members, and so forth, independent advocacy would do a much better
job at achieving those goals.257 Moreover, the decision also turned First
Amendment doctrine on its head. Holder upheld the criminalization of
a type of political speech, long thought to be the most protected kind of
speech. And even assuming the speech could be deemed an "express
advocacy of crime," it would still have to meet the Brandenburg
threshold258 that the speech was intended and likely to produce
"imminent lawless" action. Lastly, while the majority sided with the
plaintiffs that the statute is essentially a content-based regulation of
speech,259 which would have normally necessitated a strict scrutiny
review,260 the majority employed a "demanding standard." But the
standard as applied was far from demanding. Indeed, this was the most
common complaint about the case amongst academic commentators.
With the exception of a declaration submitted by Kenneth R. McKune,
an associate coordinator for counterterrorism in the State Department
cited in the opinion, the Court largely deferred to the judgment of the
political branches of government as to the essential means necessary
for combating terrorism and protecting national security.261 The Court
readily accepted the assertion that the support provided by these NGOs
was fungible in character and inevitably freed up the resources of the
255. Holder, 561 U.S. at 8.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id. at 51-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
259. Holder, 561 U.S. at 27 (distinguishing the facts of the case from those in O'Brien v. United
States which only triggered intermediate scrutiny).
260. In a nutshell, strict scrutiny review allows regulation where none would ordinarily be
permitted due to the presence of compelling state interests, and provided that the regulation in
question is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive available. For examples involving the
Speech Clause, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Brown v. Entm't Merch.
Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-21 (1988).
261. David Cole, The First Amendment's Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 148 (2012) (criticizing the
deferential review used by the Court and saying it was not even demanding).
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FTOs to engage in illegal activity. It also reiterated that such type of
speech would only undermine "cooperative efforts between nations to
prevent terrorist attacks."262 Even those who were supportive of the
decision do not dispute the cursory method by which the Court disposed
of the issue.263
Inasmuch as "the phrase war power cannot be invoked as a
talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power
which can be brought within its ambit,"264 "not even the serious and
deadly problem of international terrorism can require automatic
forfeiture of First Amendment rights."265 The ease with which the
abovementioned quotations could be juxtaposed with each other
illustrates the cyclical inclination of government to overreach during
periods of insecurity; the former pertained to the anti-Communist
hysteria of the Cold War years while the latter is against the specter of
transnational terrorism that still lingers with us today. There is no
doubt that national security is a paramount countervailing interest of
the government. This has been the case for the past half century. And
yet even in Scales v. United States,266 a case which upheld the conviction
of a U.S. citizen under the Smith Act for his membership in the U.S.
Communist Party, the Court still recognized that one should manifestly
share the intent to accomplish the unlawful ends of the organization in
order to be held liable.267 Today, under § 2339B, which Holder upheld,
mere knowledge of an FTO's designation by a U.S. organization that is
providing specialized training and coordinated advocacy suffices for a
conviction. 268
262. Holder, 561 U.S. at 31-33 (giving the example of Turkey, a NATO ally and its hostile
relations with the PKK).
263. See Robert Chesney, The Supreme Court, Material Support and the Lasting Impact of
Holder, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 13, 15 (2011), available at http://
wakeforestlawreview.com/the-supreme-court-material-support-and-the-lasting-impact-of-holder-
v-humanitarian-law-project-2, archived at http://perma.cc/3NMP-CSCL (noting that the decision
was limited to the facts rather than an open-ended review of the material support statute); Peter
Margulies, Accountable Altruism: The Impact of the Federal Material Support Statute on
Humanitarian Aid, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 539, 540 (2011) (arguing that the decision
provides a capacious safe harbor nonetheless).
264. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Holder, 561 U.S. at 44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
267. Id. at 229 ("There must be clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend(s) to
accomplish (the aims of the organization) by resort to violence.' " (quoting Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).
268. Holder, 561 U.S. at 1.
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B. USAID v. Alliance for Open Society International
While Holder was a case involving content-based regulation of
speech, USAID involved viewpoint discrimination, a similarly
problematic instance in First Amendment jurisprudence.269 USAID
presented a different foreign policy interest of the U.S. government.
And the fact that it was not about national security, at least not
overtly,2 70 probably explained why the foreign policy interests of the
government were not even mentioned in the text of the decision. In
2003, Congress enacted the U.S. Leadership against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria Act, 2 7 1 which, among other things, authorized
the appropriation of federal funds for activities geared towards the
reduction and eventual eradication of these diseases. The statute was
enacted with a policy of opposing prostitution and sex trafficking
because these were deemed to contribute to the spread of such
diseases.272
Pursuant to this policy, the Act imposed two related conditions
on the funding: First, no funds appropriated through the Act could be
used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution
or sex trafficking.273 Second, only organizations with an explicit policy
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking ("Policy Requirement") could
receive funds under the Act. 2 74 Two U.S. NGOs challenged the second
269. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) ("Viewpoint discrimination is
censorship in its purest form . . . ." (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972) ("[G]overnment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter or its content."). The exception to this rule is government speech. See Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550,
553 (2005); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-95 (1991).
270. For an emphatic example of the view of foreign aid as a component of national security,
see President Barrack Obama, Speech at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-
drone-policy.htmlpagewanted all&_r 0, archived at http://perma.cc/6P7Q-KZ6Q ("[F]oreign
assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our security.").
271. Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2012)).
272. 22 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4), 117 Stat. at 718 (noting that under the Act, the President shall
establish a five-year strategy that shall:
provide that the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks shall be a priority of all
prevention efforts in terms of funding, educational messages, and activities by
promoting abstinence from sexual activity and substance abuse, encouraging
monogamy and faithfulness, promoting the effective use of condoms, and eradicating
prostitution, the sex trade, rape, sexual assault and sexual exploitation of women and
children.
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ25/pdf/PLAW-108publ25.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/X9Q9-34SH.
273. 22 U.S.C § 7631(e).
274. USAID, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25 (2013).
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condition on First Amendment grounds as compelled speech.275 In the
interim, the Department of Human and Health Services ("HHS") and
USAID, as the implementing agencies, issued new guidelines that
allowed recipients of funds through the Act to work with organizations
not bound by the Policy Requirement. The NGO recipients should
"retain objective integrity and independence from any affiliated
organization," for example, by keeping separate accounting records and
separate personnel and facilities. 276
To frame the question, however, as simply a conflict between the
power of Congress under the Spending Clause to choose appropriate
partners to carry out federal programs, on the one hand, and the right
of private U.S. groups and individuals not to espouse views contrary to
their own beliefs, on the other, is incomplete. Chief Justice Roberts's
majority opinion in USAID emphasized that the Policy Requirement
unconstitutionally regulated conduct outside the program since the
condition was also placed on the recipient rather than the funds
alone.27 7 Further, the Court held that the HHS/USAID guidelines,
which allowed for the creation of affiliates, did not remedy the violation
because its very separateness meant that the recipient could not
express its own beliefs.2 78 The Court also rejected the assertion made
by the government that, citing Holder, money is fungible, and without
such condition, the recipient NGO could use its private funds, the very
funds that a federal grant would have freed up, to undermine the
government's message on prostitution.279 The difference, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, was that there was evidence in that context for the claim
that support for FTOs' nonviolent operations was ultimately funneled
to their violent, unlawful activities, 280 and there was none in USAID.
But as previously noted, those findings in Holder were conclusions,
rather than evidence. And true enough, even in his dissent, Justice
Scalia wrote that this issue of fungibility need not even be established
by evidence because the same risk exists here.281
275. Id. at 2326.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2330-31. Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991) (holding HHS's
prohibition of certain projects from engaging in abortion counseling or in activities advocating
abortion did not violate First Amendment), with Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
549 (2001) (holding restriction preventing Legal Services Corporation from providing funding to
any organization representing clients in order to amend or challenge welfare laws violated First
Amendment).
278. USAID, 133 S. Ct. at 2331.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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It is significant that the briefs and transcript for the oral
arguments on the case are peppered with references to the foreign
locales of both the government and citizen speech at issue. The
government emphasized that the program is primarily conducted in
"foreign territory" and "distant lands,"282 hence the need for the Policy
Requirement o function as an ex ante commitment. The NGOs declared
that their projects include "preventing mother to child transmission in
Tanzania, caring for orphans of AIDS victims in Kenya, and providing
HIV/AIDS support services in places like Vietnam."283 The instance of
compelled speech, if indeed that was what it was, would not only be at
the moment of signing of the award agreement with USAID but during
each and every instance of the NGOs going about their activities in
different places abroad. Even the Court itself joined this extraterritorial
discussion during oral arguments when Justice Ginsburg expressed
skepticism about the efficacy of the HHS/USAID guidelines on separate
affiliates, stating "there is a difference in this international setting."284
Justice Kennedy also noted that this was a case in which the foreign
affairs sphere is implicated, a sphere where the executive branch
generally enjoys deference.285 And yet Justice Scalia's dissent only
addressed this tangentially when he stressed the all-too-valid need for
the government to enlist the assistance of those who would carry its
goals to fruition.286 Nothing of such sort appeared in the majority
opinion either. Instead, it proceeded with a traditional First
Amendment analysis using government speech and compelled speech
precedents.
C. Whither the Extraterritorial First Amendment?
The unfortunate omissions made in these recent cases only
exacerbate the existing state of ambiguity. As we have already seen,
territory can and does impact constitutional doctrine. Territory shapes
the arguments that lawyers make even though it does so without
recognition of its centrality, and it also influences the analysis of courts.
282. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 15.
283. Id. at 36.
284. Id. at 18 ("[G]etting an NGO, a new NGO, recognized in dozens of oreign countries is no
simple thing to accomplish.").
285. See id. at 27.
286. USAID, 133 S. Ct. at 2332-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
The program is valid only if the Government is entitled to disfavor the opposing view
(here, advocacy of or toleration of prostitution). And if the program can disfavor it, so
can the selection of those who are to administer the program. There is no risk that this




As an instance of an extraterritorial First Amendment, then, how can
we best explain Holder's departure from existing First Amendment
precedent and USAID's adherence to it? It should be noted that these
two cases are the first free speech cases with foreign affairs implications
decided in the post-9/11 era, a period when national security
considerations are at an all-time high, perhaps comparable to that of
the Cold War at its peak.
Determining the location of the speech is only the first step. The
next step is to evaluate the government interest that inevitably clashes
with such private speech. Not unlike its domestic counterpart, an
extraterritorial First Amendment does not trump all other competing
interests, especially in the foreign affairs realm when "the Executive
receives its greatest deference and in which we [courts] must recognize
the necessity for the nation to speak with a single voice."287 Not all
foreign affairs interests are created equal, however, or at least not
perceived in the same way by implementing officials. After all, not one
State Department or USAID official filed an affidavit indicating the
foreign policy aspect of the program, even though that program was
part of the broader foreign aid effort of the U.S. government. Judging
from the USAID Court's decision, this was a nonfactor. As Justice
Scalia described in his dissent, it was a "minor federal program."288 In
contrast, national security concerns loomed large from the outset of the
Holder litigation. And the international nature of the FTOs was
emphasized forcefully by all sides. In fact, one can easily deduct this
from among the safe harbors provided in the decision: the restriction
only applies to coordination with FTOs, not domestic organizations. As
Professor David Cole has argued, it is easier to control and monitor the
conduct of domestic organizations, and they are generally subject to the
full panoply of local laws and regulations.289 But that is not because the
"ability to associate and speak with foreign organizations is ... less
essential,"290 he stated. The same self-governance concerns underlying
287. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
288. USAID, 133 S. Ct. at 2333 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("I am frankly dubious that a condition
for eligibility to participate in a minor federal program such as this one . . . ."). But this is not to
say the program is unimportant. The United States provides almost sixty percent of the global
funds, about $4.5 billion out of a total of $7.6 billion, allotted to fight the global AIDS epidemic.
Cutting off this funding, especially in low-income countries, would be catastrophic. See BENJAMIN
GOBET ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & UNAIDS, FINANCING THE RESPONSE To AIDS
IN Low- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES(2012), available at http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/0 1/7347-08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
9G5S-7HAR.
289. Cole, supra note 261, at 173-74.
290. Id. at 173.
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pure domestic interactions could be at the core of these international
communications too. Instead, there is the reality that the political
branches of government have a broader interest in matters implicating
foreign affairs for which we do not yet have any alternative at the
moment but to recognize in view of the current international order.
No doubt national security is a capacious concept. Even though
Holder can arguably be cabined to specific, specialized speech
coordinated with FTOs for national security purposes, Holder's chilling
effect could be such that it would render an extraterritorial speech right
illusory.291 Hence, one proposed solution is to go the legislative route
and ask Congress to narrow the scope of the material support laws and
require some proof of connection between the skills and training
provided by U.S. groups to certain foreign groups and the latter's
unlawful activities.292
Beyond the material support context, however, the issue of
extraterritorial speech is only going to become more salient in the
coming years and may start to involve foreign conversation partners.
Thus, we have yet to see if existing doctrines developed within an
exclusively domestic milieu can be exported as is or will be
appropriately tailored to an extraterritorial setting. Any such tailoring
would not be an extraordinary step, as this also happens within the
domestic context. At the very least, such recognition would be a salutary
reminder that government powers abroad are not unconstrained even
by invoking the mantra of foreign affairs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Boumediene, Justice Scalia warned that the
decision "clears a wide path for the Court to traverse in the years to
come."293 That path presumably pertains not only to the general idea
that even aliens, under some circumstances, could be entitled to make
constitutional claims against the U.S. government but also to the notion
that constitutional rights in general are not necessarily limited in its
291. For a more optimistic account of the effects of these kinds of cases, see, for example, Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273,
283-284 (2003):
Knowing that government officials in the past have in fact exaggerated threats to
national security or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats
that actually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about contemporary
claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of proposed government
responses to threats has decreased.
292. See, e.g., Shouting Fire in a Global Theater, supra note 9, at 162-163.
293. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 843 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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application to the domestic setting. It is a development to be welcomed,
not shunned.
This Article has argued the case for an extraterritorial First
Amendment, relying on historical analogies, theoretical justifications,
the international legal commitments of the United States, and existing
(though ambiguous) judicial precedents. In fact, this argument is
already implicit in many court decisions-most recently and notably in
the first two free speech cases with foreign affairs implications decided
by the Supreme Court in the post-9/11 period: Holder and USAID. The
Court has shown a history and method of recognizing extraterritorial
First Amendment interests that have been otherwise obscured in free
speech doctrine while situating them within the broader context of
extraterritoriality cases. Thus, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights
that have been the subject of an extraterritorial analysis, the First
Amendment right to free speech could be claimed by U.S. citizens
wherever (though not always applicable necessarily), while aliens could
also do so when they have been subjected to government actions.
Recognizing an extraterritorial First Amendment does not preclude
such interest, however, from being balanced against competing
interests of the government in matters involving national security and
foreign affairs. Recognizing this right helps the courts to be right where
the Constitution is: safeguarding rights even beyond the water's edge.
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